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HE most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the
human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid is-
land of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was
not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its
own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing
together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of
reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad
from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety
of a new dark age.1
I. INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes said that imposing a criminal sentence is the most diffi-
cult thing a judge ever has to do.2 Imposing punishment, in an even-
handed and dispassionate manner, is an awesome responsibility. 3
There are four commonly recognized cornerstones of punishment:4
1. H.P. Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu, in THE DUNWICH HORROR AND OTHERS 125,
125 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) (describing the responsi-
bility of fixing a sentence as "grave"); Daniel E. Walthen, When the Court Speaks: Effective
Communication as a Part of Judging, 57 ME. L. REv. 449, 452 (2005) ("Sentencing deci-
sions are often described as among the most difficult that a judge faces."); H. Lee Sarokin,
Confessions of a Sentencing Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/confessions-of-a-sentenci b 489159.html
(noting that in his work as a federal judge, "no decision required more thought and agony
than a sentence to be imposed"). But see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 15 (1973) (noting that while "[jiudges are commonly heard to say
that sentencing is the grimmest and most solemnly absorbing of their tasks," judges actu-
ally spend little time talking, reading, or writing about sentencing issues, and often spend
little time reviewing the facts-sometimes less than an hour-before sentencing a defen-
dant to a decade in prison).
3. Presumably, the public wants a judge who neither imposes a sentence out of sym-
pathy for the defendant nor out of anger, but from balanced view of the circumstances. See
Lawrence B. Solum, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: A Tournament of Vir-
tue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (2005) (noting such judicial temperament as one of
the largely uncontested judicial virtues).
4. A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the explication of punishment, but
relatively few have challenged the concept of punishment itself. For an example of this
scholarship, see DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION,
CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 1-2 (2006) (challenging the presumption that punish-
ment is the appropriate response to crime).
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retribution (also known as just deserts), 5 deterrence, 6 incapacita-
5. See generally, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 111 (Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (all describing retributive basis of
punishment); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF Ti-IE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); RICHARD
G. SINGER, JusT DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 14-30 (1979).
One of the strongest expressions of retribution was formulated by Kant. See IMMANUEL
KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T & T Clark) (1887).
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world-
the last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolu-
tion was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may
realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain upon
the people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as participators in the
murder as a public violation of Justice.
Id. at 198. Hegel, also a retributivist, suggested that punishment should be conceived of as
a right, not as an evil to be suffered:
Punishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his own will. The
violation of right has been proclaimed by the criminal as his own right. His
crime is the negation of right. Punishment is the negation of this negation,
and consequently an affirmation of right, solicited and forced upon the crimi-
nal by himself.
Karl Marx, Punishment and Society, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT
358, 358 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed. 1972) (quoting Georg Hegel). Of course, during much of
the twentieth century, retributivist theory was derided by jurists and scholars alike. See,
e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[N]o one has
ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society."); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (referencing the "tardy and unfinished substitution
of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation of
public prosecution"); Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 ("Retribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law."); Austin MacCormick, The Prison's Role in Crime Preven-
tion, 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 36, 40 (1950) ("Punishment as retribution belongs to a
penal philosophy that is archaic and discredited by history."). But see Matthew Haist, De-
terrence in a Sea of "Just Deserts": Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of "Limiting
Retributivism"? 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 799 (2009) ("Over the last quarter of
the twentieth century and into the early part of the twenty-first century, retributivism has
reestablished itself as the dominant theory behind criminal justice."). Even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged a role for retributivism in punishment. See Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984) (noting that "retribution is an element of all punishments society
imposes").
6. See generally, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL
JUST., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECrs OF CRIMINAL SANC-
TIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); PACKER, supra note 5, at
39-48; FRANKLIN R. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Johannes Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 649 (1970) (all describing deterrent basis of punishment); Ernest van den
Haag, The Criminal Law as a Threat System, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1982);
Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23
CRIME & JUST. 1 (1998). Deterrence was championed enthusiastically by Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., who wrote:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged
... I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to
make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common
good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you
like. But the law must keep its promises.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 17, 1925), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI,
1916-1925 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). But deterrence was criticized, sharply, by
Hegel. See, e.g., GEORG HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 125-26 (Allen
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tion,7 and rehabilitation. 8 Punishment may serve additional functions, 9
but these four bases shape most jurisprudential thinking about punish-
ment.10 Retributivist theories are retrospective, concerned with the cor-
rect punishment due for prior acts.1 Conversely, the other three theories
are prospective, focused on how future criminal acts can be prevented. 12
Some theorists argue that retribution-and retribution alone-should de-
termine criminal penalties,' 3 but pure retributivists are rarely spotted in
W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991) ("To justify punishment in this way is like raising
one's stick at a dog; it means treating a human being like a dog instead of respecting his
honour and freedom.").
7. See COMM. ON RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUST., supra note
6, at 64-80; PACKER, supra note 5, at 48-53; Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Crime
Control: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 5 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1-5 (1983); Selective Incapacitation:
Reducing Crime through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512-19 (1982)
(all describing incapacitation).
Recognition that imprisonment's distinctive feature as a penal method is its
incapacitative effect has implications for criminal justice policy. The contri-
bution of prisons to crime control by way of rehabilitation programs or indi-
vidual and general deterrence is problematic. But there can be no doubt that
an offender cannot commit crimes in the general community while
incarcerated.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 89 (1991).
8. See generally, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E.
GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982); PACKER, supra note 5, at 53-58; ToNY
WARD & SHADD MARUNA, REHABILITATION (2007) (all describing rehabilitative basis of
punishment).
9. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUS-
TICE 1336, 1340-41 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (identifying "norm reinforcement" and
vengeance as additional utilitarian bases of punishment); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362-64 (1997) (discussing expressive
function of punishment).
10. See Don M. Gottfredson, Effects of Judges' Sentencing Decisions on Criminal Ca-
reers, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Washington, DC), Nov. 1999, at 3-4,
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178889.pdf (indicating the relative weight
that 18 county sentencing judges assigned to various goals of sentencing).
11. See, e.g., R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 19-20
(2001) ("[Retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial ef-
fects but of its intrinsic justice as a response to crime; the justificatory relationship holds
between present punishment and past crime, not between present punishment and future
effects.").
12. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 118 (rev. ed. 1990) ("And how can such a general justifying
aim be prevention, since state punishment waits until a crime has already occurred?"). The
answer, of course, is that punishment under the utilitarian theory seeks to prevent other
criminal acts. This is not a novel insight. In the Protagoras, Plato states:
In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has
done wrong in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind
vengeance like a beast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for
the sake of the crime that has been committed-after all one cannot undo
what is past-but for the sake of the future, to prevent either the same man
or, by the spectacle of his punishment, someone else, from doing wrong
again.
PLATO, Protagoras, in 71 THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 308, 321 (Edith Hamil-
ton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 2nd prtg., 1963).
13. See KANT, supra note 5, at 195 (noting that utilitarian aims cannot justify punish-
ment; rather, it can "be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has
committed a Crime"); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBIL-
1332 [Vol. 64
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the real world. Most jurists believe that deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation are legitimate bases for punishment. 14
Unless the judge is a pure retributivist, considerations about future
criminal conduct will color his or her decision. If the reduction of future
crime is an appropriate goal of punishment, it is worth noting that deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation produce empirically measurable
results. It can be claimed, for example, that crime X is optimally pun-
ished by penalty Y, reducing future offending more than penalty Z. Such
claims can be tested and are "falsifiable. ''15 Thus, from the standpoint of
utilitarian penology, some punishments are demonstrably superior.16 A
judge can know "what works" in sentencing.1 7 But how should a judge
assess the risk of recidivism and then weigh that risk against other consid-
ITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) ("Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by
the moral culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only
because, the offender deserves it."). Presumably, a pure retributivist would not care about
the collateral effects of punishment. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a
Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 746 (2009) ("[A] moral claim that an offender deserves ten
years in prison is not affected by the fact that the state cannot afford to support him, or
that the offender's incarceration will further exacerbate racial disproportions in the prison
population.").
14. See NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 8 (1991) ("In practice Anglo-American
sentencers tend to be eclectic, reasoning sometimes as utilitarians but sometimes, when
they are outraged by a crime, as retributivists.")
15. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 33 (2007) ("Simplistic, basic, but predictive-[binary
prediction based on objective measures] can be proven right. It can be validated, tested,
replicated. It is a form of technical knowledge that makes possible 'right' and 'wrong'
answers."). This is the principle of falsifiability, as championed by philosopher of science,
Karl Popper. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 41 (1959) ("I shall
require [of a scientific system] that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out,
by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scien-
tific system to be refuted by experience."). Falsifiable claims are not necessarily quantita-
tive, but the numeric expression of risk may help establish an air of authority that does not
extend to qualitative approaches. See United States v. Reich, 661 F. Supp. 371, 378
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The formulae and the grid distance the offender from the sentencer-
and from the reasons for punishment-by lending the process a false aura of scientific
certainty."); HANS J. EYSENCK, GENIUS: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF CREATIVITY 4 (1995)
(quoting Lord Kelvin as stating that "[o]ne's knowledge of science begins when he can
measure what he is speaking about, and expresses it in numbers"); J.C. Oleson, Blowing
Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693,723 (2011) ("By masking the politics of sentenc-
ing beneath a veneer of science, the Guidelines made punishment appear more rational,
empirical, and precise.").
16. Retrospectively oriented punishments, on the other hand, might be scaled, but
cannot be disproved. See Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1334-35 (2006) ("Importantly in this 'age of empiricism,'
the moral claims of retributivism are non-falsifiable: one can dispute whether a punishment
accords with community sentiments of desert, but one cannot disprove the underlying
claim that it is morally right to impose deserved punishment.").
17. The phrase is used advisedly, reflecting Martinson's (in)famous article that closed
the door on rehabilitative penology. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and
Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 22-23 (1974) (concluding from a review of
231 studies that rehabilitative programs did not significantly reduce rates of recidivism).
But see Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sen-
tencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 254 (1979) (recanting his "nothing works" find-
ings by writing that "I withdraw this conclusion").
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erations? That is a difficult question. There is little academic training
available to learn sentencing. Most law schools do not offer courses in
penology or sentencing, 18 and most legal work does not equip the lawyer
with directly relevant experience. Yes, both the defense lawyer and the
prosecutor are exposed to sentencing, but they participate in that activity
as parties. Even veteran prosecutors, exhorted to "do justice" instead of
win at any cost, 19 are not required to balance the interests of all involved
parties-defendant, victims, and society at large-at least not in the re-
flective and dispassionate way that a judge must.20
Judges confronted with the responsibility of imposing sentences may
turn to early criminal codes,21 seminal works by early and contemporary
philosophers,22 and the jurisprudential work of professional societies.23
18. See FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 13 ("Law students learn something about the rules
of the criminal law, about the trial of cases, and, increasingly, about the rights of defend-
ants before and during trial. They receive almost no instruction pertinent to sentencing.").
Approximately thirty U.S. law schools offer courses on general sentencing, as compared to
150+ that offer death penalty courses. See Doug Berman, Questioning Law School Priori-
ties in Instruction and Programming, SENT'G L. & POL'Y (Feb. 19, 2008), http://sentenc-
ing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2008/02/questioning-law.html (providing
these estimates). Of course, this is not universally true. In the German legal system, law
students first train as judges. See James R. Maxeiner, Integrating Practical Training and
Professional Legal Education, 2 lus GENrIUM 37, 43-44 (2008) (noting that German law
students apprentice under judicial supervision and thereby learn to craft actual judgments).
19. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States At-
torney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done."). The Court's exhortation has been echoed by Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder, who told assistant U.S. attorneys that "[y]our job is not to win cases.
Your job is to do justice. Your job is in every case, every decision that you make, to do the
right thing." Nedra Pickler, Attorney General Holder Tells Prosecutors to 'Do the Right
Thing', CNSNEWS.coM, (Apr. 9, 2009), http://cnsnews.com/node/46364.
20. See, e.g., STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SrTTNG IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988) (describing how judges think and speak about
sentencing).
21. E.g., HAMMURABI, THE OLDEST CODE OF LAWS IN THE WORLD (C. H. W. Johns
trans. 1903), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17150/17150.txt (detailing Code of
Hammurabi); WALTER WINK, ENGAGING THE POWERS: DISCERNMENT AND RESISTANCE
IN A WORLD OF DOMINATION 39-40 (1992) (referencing the "earliest known law code,
Urukagina's edict (ca. 2300 B.C.E., Mesopotamia)"); The Laws of the Twelve Tables, http://
www.constitution.org/sps/spsOl-l.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2011) (providing English lan-
guage translation of the twelve tables of ancient Roman law).
22. E.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832);
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publish-
ing, Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISH-
MENT (2009) (1830); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); H. L.
A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4-5
(1968); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOSEPH RAz, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF AR-
ISTOTLE 935 (Richard McKeon ed., W. D. Ross trans., 1941).
23. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1
2007); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING (3d ed., 1994) (identifying
principles of fair sentencing).
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In many jurisdictions, sentencing guidelines channel judicial authority
in that they identify appropriate penalties within the broad ranges estab-
lished by legislatures. 24 But recent decisions by the Supreme Court have
prohibited certain forms of guideline sentencing.2 5 Today, for example,
in the federal judiciary, sentencing guidelines are advisory,26 and any dis-
trict court judge who treats a guideline sentence as presumptively reason-
able can be reversed. 27
Accordingly, federal judges must wrestle with all of the sentencing con-
siderations enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), decide which ones are
paramount, 28 and attempt to render an appropriate gestalt judgment.
Some judges have resorted to consulting ad hoc advisory panels of fellow
judges and sentencing experts. 29 And, perhaps because there is no con-
sensus about which sentencing objectives take priority over others, it is
said that disparity in federal sentencing is increasing. 30 If that is so, 31 the
judiciary could see a return to the "bad old days" of indeterminate sen-
tencing,32 the not-so-terrific days of mandatory sentencing guide-
24. Sentencing guidelines have proven to be an effective means of channeling judicial
discretion. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus,
and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1231-32 (2005); Michael Tonry,
Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, 17 CRIME & JUST. 137, 144-45, 180 (1993).
25. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232-33 (2005) (applying the Blakely
holding to the federal sentencing guidelines); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 302, 308
(2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from enhancing sentences
based on facts other than those admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt);.
26. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
27. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009).
28. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding
and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19,
20 (2003) (noting unresolved tensions in purposes of federal sentencing).
29. See Mark Fass, In Sentencing, Judge Blasts Wall Street's 'Corrupt' Culture, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 26, 2010 (describing Eastern District of New York Judge Jack B. Weinstein's use
of an advisory panel in the sentencing of Eric Butler).
30. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE Booker Report's Multivariate Regression Anal-
ysis 2 (2010) ("Black male offenders received longer sentences than white male offenders.
The differences in sentence length have increased steadily since Booker.").
31. Other researchers looking at post-Booker disparity have reached contradictory
conclusions. See Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., The "Liberation" of Federal Judges' Discretion in
the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence Be-
tween Courts?, JUST. Q. (forthcoming).
32. See Jonathan Chiu, United States v. Booker: The Demise of Mandatory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Return of Indeterminate Sentencing, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
1311, 1311 (2005). The reference to "bad old days" of sentencing comes from testimony of
Senator Patrick Leahy. Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://judici-
ary.senate.gov/hearings (type "Blakely v. Washington" in the sites search bar; follow
hyperlink no. 1; follow "The Honorable Patrick Leahy" hyperlink on right-hand side of
browser) (describing the pre-guidelines period as "the bad old days of fully indeterminate
sentencing when improper factors such as race, geography and the predilections of the
sentencing judge could drastically affect the sentence"); Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher
Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 2009 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 301, 344 n.3 (2006) (quoting Senator Leahy).
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lines,33 or the widespread adoption of mandatory minimum sentences.34
Fortunately, however, another approach could provide federal judges
with much-needed guidance: evidence-based sentencing. 35
Judges engaging in evidence-based sentencing use data in an actuarial
manner instead of applying mere professional judgment.36 There are
good reasons for judges to adopt this approach because actuarial assess-
ment has been demonstrated to be more effective than clinical judgment
in a wide range of fields.37 Today, there is growing interest in actuarial
sentencing in the United States and abroad, and this attraction to the
approach will intensify as economic scarcity forces cash-strapped jurisdic-
tions to sentence "smarter, '38 reducing the costs associated with correc-
33. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & Scovr A. GILBERT, FED. JUD. CTR., THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 4
(1997) ("I think guidelines which were not mandatory would be helpful for all federal and
state judges. It is the mandatory nature which creates the unfairness and the unfairness is
outrageously unjust.") (quoting a federal judge). But see William K. Sessions III, At the
Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Attempts to Achieve
Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-branch Power Struggles, J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming
2011) (suggesting that presumptive guidelines are necessary to achieve the goals of the
Sentencing Reform Act).
34. See Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (comments of Sen.
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[I]t is possible that some here in Congress
may respond by creating new mandatory minimum penalties to compensate for the unfet-
tered discretion."). Mandatory minimum sentencing has been roundly condemned by aca-
demics, expert agencies, legislators, and Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., MICHAEL
TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 5 (1996); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MANDATORY MINI-
MUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991); Molly M. Gill, Cor-
recting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of Mandatory Minimums, 21 FED. SENT'G
REP. 55, 55 (2008); Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 194-95 (1993); Michael Tonry,
Mandatory Penalties, 16 CRIME & JUST. 243, 243 (1987); Justice Breyer, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Revisited (Nov. 18, 1998), reprinted in 11 FED. SENT'G. REP. 180, 184-85 (1999);
Justice Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-09-03.html (all criticiz-
ing mandatory minimum sentences); William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address (June 18,
1993), in U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DRUGS & VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INAUGURAL SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 286
(1993) (suggesting that federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are "perhaps a
good example of the law of unintended consequences").
35. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 585, 588
(2009); Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2008).
36. See discussion infra Part II (describing evidence-based sentencing).
37. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTITFREDSON, DECISION MAK-
ING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1988); PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PRE-
DICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954).
38. The idea of smarter sentencing has already found a toehold in the criminal justice
community. See Michael Marcus, Smart Sentencing, SMARTSENTENCING.INFO (Mar. 17,
2010), http://www.smartsentencing.info/whatwrks.html. The Constitution Project's "Smart
on Crime" website also includes a number of recommendations to the administration to
improve federal sentencing. The Constitution Project, Smart on Crime: Recommendations
for the Next Administration and Congress, 2009TRANSITION.ORG, http://2009transition.org/
criminaljustice (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
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tions, while simultaneously safeguarding public safety. Part II of this
Article describes evidence-based sentencing.
Determining which characteristics should be considered in actuarial
sentencing, however, may prove to be problematic. Although criminolo-
gists have identified a number of variables that appear to be robust
predictors of recidivism,39 and although judges have wide discretion in
sentencing,40 several of the factors identified as predictive by criminolo-
gists (e.g., race, gender) have been struck down as unconstitutional by
some courts.41 Such problematic items can be eliminated from risk as-
sessment instruments, but as the variables associated with protected cate-
gories are struck from assessment tools, the predictive power of these
instruments wanes.42 Should the most robust variables be used or omit-
ted? Some highly-predictive variables are uncontroversial, but others are
highly contentious. Part III of this Article briefly surveys the history of
recidivism prediction efforts and outlines the criminological evidence for
seventeen variables associated with recidivism.
Part IV considers three types of challenges associated with the use of
empirical sentencing factors: logistical, legal, and philosophical. First, in
terms of logistical challenges, some sentencing factors are easy to observe
and measure, like age, but others may be too expensive to assess and
require significant resources to measure (e.g., association with criminal
peers or clinical assessment of IQ). Second, in terms of legal challenges,
some sentencing factors, such as criminal record, would raise no eye-
brows, but explicit consideration of other factors, for example race, would
be controversial. Although courts probably would not uphold defend-
ants' challenges to evidence-based sentencing based on free speech,
double jeopardy, or trial by jury rights,43 they may be sympathetic to due
process or equal protection claims. 44 Sentencing judges may be barred
from considering risk predictors such as race, gender, or age. That said, it
is possible that the use of suspect categories at sentencing could survive
39. See, e.g., Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender
Recidivism: What Works! 34 CRIMINOLOGY 57, 576 (1996); Gottfredson, supra note 10, at
2-3.
40. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (holding that sentencing
judges "may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to
the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come."); Wil-
liams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959) ("In discharging his duty of imposing a proper
sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigat-
ing and aggravating circumstances involved in the crime.").
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) ("'A defendant's
race or nationality may play no role in the administration of justice, including at sentenc-
ing."' (quoting United States v. Leuing, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994))).
42. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based Justice: Prediction and
Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 174 (1987) (noting that omitting factors that are
correlated with race from a model to predict recidivism reduced the accuracy of the model
by five to twelve percentage points).
43. See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional
Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47 (2011) (noting courts' reluctance to recognize
constitutional rights in sentencing proceedings).
44. See, e.g., Kaba, 480 F.3d at 159; Leuing, 40 F.3d at 586-87 (reversing sentence and
assigning sentencing to new judge for consideration of race or gender).
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intermediate-or even strict-scrutiny analysis. 45 While it is implausible
that a court would uphold the imposition of a sentence on the basis of
race or gender alone, courts might be permitted to assess risk by consider-
ing race and gender in combination with other variables. After all, in the
context of higher education, the Supreme Court has struck down the use
of racial quotas but has upheld the consideration of race when it was one
among other factors. 46 Third, the philosophical challenges associated
with evidence-based sentencing are just as thorny as the legal ones. Im-
posing lengthy sentences on some defendants, simply because they re-
semble other recalcitrant offenders, may offend some judges' sense of
justice. 47 Further, to the extent that immutable characteristics are predic-
tive of recidivism (justifying punishment under utilitarian grounds), this
may imply that the offenders lack meaningful control over their criminal
behavior (making the imposition of punishment problematic on retribu-
tivist grounds). Certainly, individual differences play a role in shaping
the susceptibility to reoffending, but it may be difficult for many judges to
surrender the fictions that all persons are truly equal under the law and
that except in stark cases, such as duress or diminished capacity, all citi-
zens enjoy a roughly equal predisposition to obeying or violating the
law.48
Ultimately, however, courts must consider these issues.49 When judges
impose sentences, they act upon predictions about future criminal con-
duct, either implicitly or explicitly. They do so every day.50 Unless they
are prepared to ignore all utilitarian bases of punishment, judges must
assess the risk of future crime. It has long been so. But while the idiosyn-
cratic assessment of risk has long been ubiquitous in the criminal justice
45. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (reporting that
22-33% of laws reviewed survive strict scrutiny review).
46. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (striking down the Uni-
versity of Michigan's point-based affirmative action admissions policy for undergraduates
after characterizing it as a quota system), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335, 343
(2003) (upholding the University of Michigan's affirmative action admissions program at
the law school after noting that race was used as a "plus factor" to achieve the compelling
state interest of a diverse student body).
47. See, e.g., Michael Marcus, Model Penal Code Symposium: MPC-The Root of the
Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REv. 751, 753, 768 (2009) (noting
that some commentators view sentencing with risk assessment tools as punishing defend-
ants with "false positives" or "punishment for future crimes").
48. See PACKER, supra note 5, at 74-75 ("Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it
were.").
49. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 434-35 (2006) (noting that histori-
cally "courts rarely have had to address jurisprudential considerations in making violence
risk assessments" but that "[jiurisprudential considerations in premising legal decisions on
these specific risk factors can no longer be avoided.").
50. Robert L. Bonn & Alexander B. Smith, The Case Against Using Biological Indica-
tors in Judicial Decision Making, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 3, 8 (1988) ("Prediction of an indi-
vidual's future behavior is an everyday problem for judges who sentence...").
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system,51 the effectiveness of the actuarial approach is transforming the
field, thereby creating a "new penology" premised on the management of
risk within aggregated groups.5 2 This new penology may force judges to
think differently about punishment, and-possibly-to confront some
difficult jurisprudential truths.
Part V of the Article considers the conundrum of what judges should
do with empirical assessment tools that rely on suspect variables. On the
one hand, evidence-based sentencing could provide the guidance that
federal district judges so desperately need after the decision in United
States v. Booker.53 Evidence-based sentencing could help ameliorate
the explosive growth in the Federal Bureau of Prisons54 and miti-
gate the harm that is currently done to defendants,55 their fami-
51. See JAMES Q. WILSON, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 279 (1983) ("The entire crimi-
nal justice system is shot through at every stage (bail, probation, sentencing, and parole)
with efforts at prediction, and necessarily so; if we did not try to predict, we would release
on bail or on probation either many more or many fewer persons, and make some
sentences either much longer or much shorter.").
52. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992).
53. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
54. Like the U.S. prison population generally, the federal prison population has grown
at a metastazing rate since 1980. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, A Brief History of the Bureau
of Prisons, BOP.GOV, http://www.bop.gov/about/history.gov (last visited Oct. 19, 2011)
(tracing growth of federal prison population). While there were only 24,252 inmates in
custody in 1980, the population more than doubled between 1980 and 1989, and more than
doubled again during the 1990s. Id. In fact, the federal prison population exceeded
210,000 in early 2011. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Weekly Population Report, BOP.GOV,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly-report.jsp (last updated Aug. 18, 2011) (reporting a
population of 217,785 persons). Of course, state prisons' populations have grown, too. See
HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES 2 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (showing increases in state prison popula-
tions that, while not as great as the 4.6% annual increases observed among the federal
population, still average more than 1% each year). It is reasonable to expect that in the
hands of state sentencing judges, evidence-based sentencing could also help to reduce state
prison populations. That is where the real action lies. The Federal Bureau of Prisons in-
carcerates more than 200,000 people, which is more people than live in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, Salt Lake City, Utah, or Berkeley, California. See U.S. Census Bureau, Richmond
(city), Virginia, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/516700.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011) (2006 estimate of 192,913); U.S. Census Bureau, Salt Lake (city),
Utah, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/49/4967000.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2011) (2006 population estimate of 178,858); U.S. Census Bureau, Berkley (city),
California, CENSUS.GOv, http:quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/060600.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2011) (2006 population estimate of 101,555). However, this number represents
only 9.56% of those incarcerated in the U.S. See WEST & SABOL, supra (reporting that
federal prisoners constitute 9.56% of all U.S. prisoners).
55. Evidence-based sentencing might maintain parsimony in punishment, limiting the
amount of harm inflicted to the necessary amount. But, by definition, all defendants who
are punished are harmed. See generally NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 5, 11 (1981); TODD
R. CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN PENOLOGY: OFFENDERS, VICTIMS AND THEIR COMMUNI-
TIES 6 (1994); CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE
PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 9-11 (2006); HART, supra note 22, at 4; WALKER, supra note 14,
at 1-2 (all defining punishment as harm or evil intentionally imposed by the state for crimi-
nal wrongdoing). This conception of punishment is in no way new. See THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 205 (Oxford University Press, 1996) (1961) (asserting that punishment "is an
evil inflicted by public authority."). The awareness that punishment is a harm, not a boon,
prompted one court to state that "this court shares the growing understanding that no one
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lies,56 and their communities57 (all at tremendous taxpayer expense) 58 by
locking federal offenders away for terms that dwarf what comparable of-
fenders receive in state courts. 59 But district judges may very well resent
a return to "justice by the numbers," 60 and may resist the enhancement of
a sentence on the basis of a defendant's race, sex, age, class, or 10 score.
That is understandable. But assessments of risk are part and parcel of
sentencing, and if the body of research showing that actuarial assessment
is superior to professional judgment is sound, then judges who eschew
risk assessment instruments do so to their detriment. Sentencing blindly,
these judges will either over-sentence and send to prison individuals who
present little appreciable risk to public safety or under-sentence and re-
lease dangerous criminals into communities, thereby creating new victims
of crime.
II. THE CASE FOR EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
Historically, judges were free to consider any facts that were not ex-
pressly prohibited, and to impose any sentence that fell within the broad
ranges established by the law.61 A judge could impose a sentence and
give no reason at all,62 and judicial decisions of this kind were virtually
should ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody who would not
otherwise be locked up should suffer that fate on the incongruous premise that it will be
good for him or her." United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
But see Marx, supra note 5, at 89-91 (characterizing punishment as the "right" of a
criminal).
56. See, e.g., Joyce A. Arditti & Charles McClintock, Drug Policy and Families: Casu-
alties of the War, 32 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 11, 12-18 (2001); R. Robin Miller, et al., An
Introduction and Brief Review of the Impacts of Incarceration on the African American
Family, 6 J. AFR. AM. MEN 3, 5-6 (2001) (both describing corrosive effects of incarceration
on family relationships).
57. See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCAR-
CERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 3 (2007).
58. See Matthew G. Rowland, Cost of Incarceration and Supervision, ADMIN. OFF.
U.S. CTS., (May 6, 2009), http://d.c.fd.org/library/cost.pdf (reporting annual cost of Bureau
of Prisons imprisonment in 2008 as $25,894.50).
59. See Bureau of Just. Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004-
Statistical Tables, USDOG.GOV, tbl.1.10, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscf04/ta-
bles/scs04110tab.cfm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (indicating that mean maximum sentence
length imposed is greater in federal courts than in state courts).
60. This is the title of a five-part series of articles by Mary Pat Flaherty and Joan
Biskupic published in the Washington Post during October 1996. See Mary Pat Flaherty &
Joan Biskupic, Despite Overhaul, Federal Sentencing Still Misfires, WASH. POST, Oct. 6,
1996, at Al; Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Prosecutors Can Stack the Deck, WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at Al; Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Loss of Discretion Fuels
Frustration on Federal Bench, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1996, at Al; Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan
Biskupic, Rules Often Impose Toughest Penalties on Poor, Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
1996, at Al; Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Missteps Leave Sentence Panel Short of
Goals, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1996, at Al (all describing federal sentencing under the gui-
dance of the U.S. Sentencing Commission). It is also similar to the title of a 2005 New
York Times article about evidence-based sentencing. See Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the
Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, at 18.
61. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (noting that "no federal
constitutional objection would have been possible if the ... judge had sentenced him to
death giving no reason at all.").
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unreviewable. 63 The law of sentencing was so vague that it has been
called the "high point in anti-jurisprudence." 64
The establishment of sentencing guidelines made sentencing more uni-
form. In the federal justice system, the passage of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (SRA) 65 made sentencing more regimented and more pre-
dictable. 66 The SRA prospectively abolished federal parole, 67 established
the United States Sentencing Commission,68 and directed the Sentencing
Commission to develop and promulgate federal sentencing guidelines.69
These steps alone did a great deal to standardize federal sentencing. 70
In 2005, however, in the bifurcated opinion in United States v.
Booker,71 the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment. 72 The Court remedied this violation by
striking down the provisions of the SRA that made the guidelines bind-
ing,73 thus making the guidelines advisory. Today, federal district court
judges are free to consider any factor enumerated by statute74 and may
no longer presume that a guideline sentence is reasonable. 75
But if district court judges can no longer rely on guideline sentences as
reasonable, 76 what may they use to guide their decision making? How
can they thoughtfully weigh the various sentencing factors identified in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)?
After Booker, federal judges might draw upon empirical data and im-
pose "evidence-based sentences. ' '77 Specifically, using a sentencing infor-
63. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (observing that "a sentence
imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to
review.").
64. Jeff Smith, Clothing the Emperor: Towards a Jurisprudence of Sentencing, 30
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 174 (1997).
65. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586, & 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988)).
66. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENC-
ING, X (2004), available at www.ussc.gov/Research/ResearchProjectslMiscellaneous/
15_YearStudy/15_yearstudyfull.pdf ("The guidelines have made sentencing more trans-
parent and predictable.").
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1982) (repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 211-17, 98 Stat. 1837 (1987)).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)(b) (2008).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2008); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text
(describing sentencing guidelines).
70. See KATE STITH & JosP A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 114 (1998) (noting that "elimination of parole by itself...
quite apart from any effect of the Guidelines, can be expected to reduce sentencing
variation.").
71. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
72. Id. at 226-27.
73. Id. at 245.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
75. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009).
76. Id.
77. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(iii) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (supporting evidence-based sentencing); JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM'N, AM. BAR
Ass'N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 9, 33-34
(2004), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal-justice-
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mation system, 78 judges might be provided with information that would
allow them to impose maximally efficient sentences within the statutory
ranges authorized by law,79 thereby reducing the likelihood of future
crime. This is not a new idea. The application of computers to criminal
sentencing was proposed forty years ago,80 and the Judicial Conference of
the United States (the policy-making body for the federal courts) en-
dorsed the use of empirical data in sentencing thirty years ago.8 1 There is
good reason for modern federal courts to consider adopting evidence-
based sentencing. "The statistical assessment of recidivism risk has an
eighty-year history," 82 is more accurate than predictions of violence,
83
and consistently outperforms the clinical judgment of even trained and
experienced experts. 84 "Recent advances in the science and statistical
sectionnewsletter/crimj ust-kennedyJusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf
(describing use of risk-prediction instruments to avoid unnecessary incarceration); Richard
E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy and Practice, 1
CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2009); Wolff, supra note 35.
78. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, "The Wisdom We Have Lost": Sentencing
Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361, 371 (2005) (describing sentencing informa-
tion systems).
79. See, e.g., Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 35-37 (1985) (suggesting three principles of limiting retributivism).
80. See Roberta L. Jacobs, American Implications of Sentencing by Computer, 4
RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 302, 309, 312 (1974-1975).
81. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Sept. 15-16, 1977, 74-75 (endorsing "the concept of a new probation information system"
that would, inter alia, "[p]rovide up-to-date information to guide sentencing courts in se-
lecting sentences for convicted defendants").
82. J. C. Oleson et al., Training to See Risk: Measuring the Accuracy of Clinical and
Actuarial Risk Assessments Among Federal Probation Officers, 75 FED. PROBATION 52, 52
(2011); see also HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 47-49, 77 (describing development of early
actuarial techniques and exponential proliferation of their use in modern criminal justice
system).
83. See D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT
302-03 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that, because violence (specifically) is rarer than crime (gen-
erally), it is more difficult to predict violence than recidivism). The prediction of violence
has been criticized because of a high rate of false positives. See, e.g., Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974) (describing the prediction of violence as
no more accurate than "the flip of a coin"); Morris & Miller, supra note 79, at 15-16
("With our present knowledge, with the best possible long-term predictions of violent be-
havior we can expect to make one true positive prediction of violence to the person for
every two false positive predictions."). But see Morris & Miller, supra note 79, at 17 (em-
phasizing that even at a prediction rate of one-in-three, "a group of three people, one of
whom within a few months will commit a crime of extreme personal violence, is a very
dangerous group indeed.").
84. See, e.g., ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 83, at 287 tbl.9.9; GOTTFREDSON &
GOTrFREDSON, supra note 37; MEEHL, supra note 37; William M. Grove, et al., Clinical
Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000);
Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Accuracy of Prediction Models, in 2
CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" 247 (Alfred Blumstein, et al. eds., 1986)
("In virtually every decision-making situation for which the issue has been studied, it has
been found that statistically developed predictive devices outperform human judgments.");
Oleson et al., supra note 82. Based the strength of the evidence, one researcher has con-
cluded, "[F]ailure to conduct actuarial risk assessment or consider its results is irrational,
unscientific, unethical, and unprofessional." Ivan Zinger, Actuarial Risk Assessment and
Human Rights: A Commentary, CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 607, 607
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methodologies of prediction have allowed higher degrees of automation
for actuarial risk forecasting than ever before. '85
In 1999, Don Gottfredson compared the factors considered by sentenc-
ing judges in making subjective predictions about the risk of new crime8 6
with empirically derived risk factors. 87 He looked at whether offenders
were arrested in the twenty-year period after sentencing and concluded
that empirically-derived risk measures were better at predicting future
crime than judges' subjective impressions.88
Today, there is growing interest in actuarial sentencing. The PEW
Center on the States recommended ten evidence-based sentencing initia-
tives, including the use of risk-needs assessments as a basis for sentencing
decisions.89 The Crime and Justice Institute and National Institute of
Corrections issued a report that championed evidence-based sentenc-
ing.90 The National Center for State Courts has developed a model cur-
riculum for evidence-based sentencing.91 Additionally, the American
Law Institute's recent revision to the Model Penal Code (Sentencing) ac-
knowledged a role for risk assessment instruments in the sentencing pro-
cess and called for sentencing commissions to develop "offender risk
instruments or processes, supported by current and ongoing recidivism
research of felons in the state, that will estimate the relative risks that
individual felons pose to public safety through future criminal conduct. 92
Elsewhere,93 I have described a sentencing information system that
might allow judges to identify relevant data about the offense and of-
fender to generate an easily interpretable scatter plot.
(2004). See also Redding, supra note 77, at 1 (suggesting that failing to use actuarial risk
assessment devices may "be unethical-a kind of sentencing malpractice... ").
85. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sen-
tencing, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 266, 267 (2011).
86. See Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that judges consider "[I]ong arrest
record, [s]erious offense, [l]ow social stability, [pirobation officer recommends custody,
[p]roperty crime, [n]ot a person crime, [a]ggravating factors, [l1ong conviction record, [and]
[a]ge (younger)" in predictions of recidivism).
87. See id. at 6 (noting that the empirically derived measure used "[a]ge (younger),
[l]ong arrest record, [r]ace: not white, [a]ny heroin or barbiturate use in the past 2 years,
number of prior probation sentences, alcohol use as a problem drinker (in record).. . [lhess
serious offense, [n]umber of prior jail sentences, [piroperty crime, [and] [slale of drugs
(current offense)" as predictors of rearrest).
88. Id. at 2; see also Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 37, at 247 (noting that
actuarial techniques outperform clinical prediction).
89. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ARMING THE COURTS WITH RESEARCH: 10 EVIDENCE-
BASED SENTENCING INITIATIVES TO CONTROL CRIME AND REDUCE COSTS 8 Pub. Safety
Policy Brief 2-3 (2009).
90. ROGER WARREN, CRIME & JUST. INST., EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES TO REDUCE
RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES 53 (2007).
91. See generally NAT'L CM. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY & REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A MODEL CURRICULUM FOR JUDGES
(2009).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2), 62 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
But see Michael Marcus, MPC-The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assess-
ment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 775-76 (2009) (arguing that the Model Penal Code should make
greater use of risk assessment).
93. See Oleson, supra note 15, at 743-45.
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The severity of sentence would be plotted on the horizontal axis
(representing the entire spectrum of terms of imprisonment available
under the statute) and the duration without a new arrest ("survival")
would be plotted on the vertical axis. Each point in the cloud of the
scatter plot would represent a previous case (offenders matched for
offender and offense characteristics), and by clicking on any single
point with a mouse, the judge could pull up the specifics of that case:
the name and photo of the offender, the offense of conviction, the
characteristics of the offender, and the particulars of the sentence
imposed. The judge would be able to review any educational, voca-
tional, or treatment programs that successful offenders had com-
pleted while serving their sentences, and to search online for
available, equivalent programs. If desired, the underlying documents
associated with any of the previous cases could be retrieved with a
click of the mouse. 94
By focusing on sentencing alternatives near the top of the vertical axis,
which represents individuals who survived long periods of time without
new arrests, a judge could engage in actuarial sentencing. A judge could
divert correctional resources from low-risk offenders (who actually be-
come more likely to reoffend if over-supervised) 95 to high-risk offenders
in greater need of intensive services and supervision. 96 Defendants who
are statistically most likely to recidivate could be sentenced to longer
sentences-within the statutory range- 97 and the data could suggest the
94. Id. at 745-46.
95. See, e.g., Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk
Principle: How and Why Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, in
Topics IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS ANNUAL
ISSUE (2004) (noting that providing unnecessary services to low-risk offenders wastes re-
sources that could be devoted to more-serious offenders and affirmatively increases the
risk that low-risk offenders will reoffend).
96. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, MAXIMUM IMPACT: TARGETING SUPERVISION ON
HIGHER-RISK PEOPLE, PLACES AND TIMES 9 Pub. Safety Policy Brief 3-4 (2009) ("[T]here
is considerable evidence that concentrating both services and supervision on [high risk of-
fenders] will result in significant reductions in crime and victimization.").
97. Criminological research suggests that a modest number of offenders are responsi-
ble for a disproportionate amount of crime. See, e.g., Sarnoff A. Mednick, A Bio-Social
Theory of the Learning of Law-Abiding Behavior, in BIOSOCIAL BASES OF CRIMINAL BE-
HAVIOR (Sarnoff A. Mednick & Karl 0. Christiansen eds., 1977) (reporting that 1% of
men in a Copenhagen birth cohort were responsible for more than half the crime); MAR-
VIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972) (reporting that 6.6%
of delinquents were responsible for 52% of offenses, including 71.4% of murders and
69.9% of aggravated assaults). If one can selectively incapacitate high-rate offenders, it
may be possible to substantially reduce the crime rate while avoiding the considerable
human and fiscal costs associated with incarcerating large swaths of the population. A
seminal work on selective incapacitation was published by RAND in 1982. See PETER W.
GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 37, xv-xvi (1982) (suggesting that a seven-fac-
tor analysis would allow criminal justice professionals to incapacitate high-crime offenders,
while subjecting other offenders to non-custodial punishments or brief terms incarcera-
tion). Greenwood's scale was the subject of vigorous debate. See, e.g., John Blackmore &
Jane Welsh, Selective Incapacitation: Sentencing According to Risk, 29 CRIME & DELINQ.
504, 505 (1983); Andrew von Hirsch, The Ethics of Selective Incapacitation: Observations
on the Contemporary Debate, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 175, 175 (1984). But whether or not
the Greenwood scale is methodologically or ethically acceptable, there is good reason to
think that risk-assessment instruments may once again become attractive to decision mak-
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programs and interventions that might be most helpful in prison.
Whereas, those who present little risk of recidivism could be sentenced to
brief terms of incarceration or non-custodial sentences.98 Sentences could
be tailored to the particulars of the offense and the offender. 99
Of course, under this approach (identifying optimal sentences by
matching the offender to other offenders with similar characteristics, Who
were sentenced for similar crimes, and then looking for the least punitive
punishment that produces the lowest rate of recidivism), 00 two offenders
guilty of identical crimes may be sentenced to different sentences because
of variations in their personal characteristics.' 0 ' Under an actuarial sen-
tencing regime, parity-in-punishment, often described as the paramount
objective of the SRA,a02 may be compromised. But this problem may be
ers in the criminal justice system. In 2008, the United States incarcerated more than 2.2
million persons in prisons and jails; more than 1-in-100 adults were behind bars. PEW CTR.
ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31 4-5 (2009). If one counts individuals on probation or parole (as
well as those who are incarcerated), more than 7.3 million people were under state or
federal supervision in 2008. Id. However, in recent years, as U.S. budgets have been
slashed, many jurisdictions have struggled to operate their prisons and correctional facili-
ties with available funds. See, e.g., Jeff Carlton, Milestone: Inmate Population Poised to
Dip, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2009, at A30 ("The inmate population has risen steadily since
the early 1970s as states adopted get-tough policies that sent more people to prison and
kept them there longer. But tight budgets now have states rethinking these policies and
the costs that come with them."). Any instrument or scale that allows decision makers to
accurately identify high-rate offenders will be welcomed as a means to respond to manage
social and fiscal conditions.
98. This was the approach adopted by the Commonwealth of Virginia; high-risk of-
fenders are imprisoned while those who are statistically unlikely to recidivate receive non-
custodial, alternative sentences. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 17 (2002); Matthew Kleiman et al.,
Using Risk Assessment to Inform Sentencing Decisions for Nonviolent Offenders in Vir-
ginia, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 106 (2007) (both describing Virginia sentencing scheme).
99. With the click of a mouse, a judge could look at the specific prison programs that
offenders completed while in custody, and could also look at the conditions of supervision
that were imposed upon those successful offenders during supervised release. By recom-
mending that an offender be designated to a comparable prison facility, with access to the
same prison programs that highly successful offenders had completed, and by imposing
comparable conditions of release that successful offenders had, a judge would provide an
offender with the same environmental opportunities that appeared to make a difference
for other, similarly situated offenders.
100. This approach is consistent with both the parsimony provision in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) ("The court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary"); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) ("The
court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider.., the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct").
101. The Supreme Court endorsed an individualized approach to sentencing in Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949). "The belief no longer prevails that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past
life and habits of a particular offender." Id. at 247. Of course, such an approach may be
distasteful to those who favor retribution-based punishment. The notion that a first-time
offender should serve a long prison sentence just because he resembles other first-time
offenders (who avoided recidivism only when they received long prison sentences) may
seem like punishing him for the crimes of others.
102. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and
the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 295 (1993)
(describing alleviation of sentencing disparity as the "first and foremost" goal of the SRA).
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more apparent than real. After all, the ability to impose "like" sentences
in "like" cases becomes possible only after someone has determined
which characteristics are relevant for the purposes of punishment. 10 3
Which characteristics are relevant? What characteristics should a sen-
tencing information system use in matching a defendant to other offend-
ers? Should the judge consider static factors (i.e., historical
characteristics that cannot be altered, such as sex, age, or age at first ar-
rest), dynamic factors (i.e., characteristics, resources, circumstances, be-
havior, or attitudes that can change throughout one's lifespan, such as
drug use, association with criminal peers, or lack of remorse), or some
combination of these?
Congress directed that the SRA guidelines be "entirely neutral as to
the race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status of
offenders"' 1  and take into account, although only to the extent that they
are relevant to sentencing, eleven characteristics: (1) age; (2) education;
(3) vocational skills; (4) mental and emotional conditions to the extent
that such conditions mitigate the defendant's culpability or to the extent
that such conditions are otherwise plainly relevant; (5) physical condition,
including drug dependence; (6) previous employment record; (7) family
ties and responsibilities; (8) community ties; (9) role in the offense; (10)
criminal history; and (11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for
a livelihood.' 0 5
So directed, the Sentencing Commission seized upon criminal history
as highly relevant,10 6 but concluded that four of the eleven characteristics
identified by Congress are not ordinarily relevant: a defendant's educa-
103. Most people would think nothing of it if, for sentencing purposes, a judge com-
pared a (tall, blue-eyed, blonde) first-time offender convicted of drug trafficking to another
(short, brown-eyed, redheaded) first-time offender convicted of drug trafficking. But if,
for sentencing purposes, the judge compared a (tall, blue-eyed, blonde) five-time rapist to
a (tall, blue-eyed, blonde) first-time drug trafficker, it would seem irrational. See Ronald
Blackburn, On Moral Judgements and Personality Disorders, 153 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 505,
505 (1988) ("Groups that are homogenous in terms of one domain will not be so when
classified in terms of another."); Barbara S. Meierhoefer, Individualized and Systemic Jus-
tice in the Federal Sentencing Process, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 889, 891 (1992) ("There is no
disagreement that similar offenders should be sentenced similarly. The problem.., is that
there is no consensus as to what defines 'similar offenders.'"). In order to say that one is
comparing like defendants to like defendants, one must decide which factors are relevant.
See Peter K. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539-42 (1982)
(noting that "likes should be treated alike" is a tautology without real explanatory value).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
105. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) further directed the Sentencing Commission to assure that
the guidelines reflected the general inappropriateness of considering education, vocational
skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties in recom-
mending a term of imprisonment. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2006).
106. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 41 (1987) ("From a crime control perspec-
tive, a criminal history component is especially important because it is predictive of
recidivism."); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 924 (1990) (noting commissioners




tion and vocational skills, 10 7 employment record, 10 8 family ties and re-
sponsibilities,10 9 and mental and emotional conditions. 110
Of course, the federal sentencing guidelines are no longer binding,"'
and federal judges are free to base their sentences upon any factors per-
mitted by law, including those deemed not ordinarily relevant by the
Commission. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-not 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(d)-drives contemporary federal sentencing.
If the judge is interested in identifying the penalty that optimally
reduces the risk of recidivism, which variables are most relevant? Should
the judge consider the eleven variables (age, education, vocational skills,
mitigating mental and emotional conditions, physical condition, employ-
ment record, family ties, role in offense, criminal history, and dependence
on crime for livelihood) that Congress directed the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission to consider? What about the variables that Congress told the
Commission to ignore (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and
socio-economic status)? Are there other predictors of recidivism which,
according to criminological research, the judge should assess? Part III of
this Article will discuss the variables that best predict reoffending.
III. USING EMPIRICAL VARIABLES TO
PREDICT RECIDIVISM
Over time, social scientists have considered a host of variables and at-
tempted to assess their relationship to recidivism. There is a broad con-
sensus about many of these variables. Indeed, "[t]here is no
disagreement in the criminological literature about some of the predictors
of adult offender recidivism, such as age, gender, past criminal history,
early family factors, and criminal associates."'" 2 It would be useful for a
judge to know which factors are correlated with recidivism. It would be
even more useful if that judge knew a bit about how those factors might
relate to recidivism. Even a cursory review of criminological research
could provide judges with a much richer understanding of the variables
related to recidivism. Part III.A provides an overview of the develop-
ment of risk assessment and Part III.B provides some criminological
background for seventeen variables deemed highly predictive of
recidivism.
107. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2
(2008).
108. Id. at § 5H1.5.
109. Id. at § 5H1.6.
110. Id. at § 5H1.3.
111. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (holding that the sentencing
court may depart from guidelines). That being said, many sentencing judges used guide-
lines ranges as a kind of safe harbor of reasonableness to avoid being reversed on appeal.
But even this is not absolute. See id. at 367 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting courts of
appeals should review within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness instead of treating
them as per se reasonable).
112. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 576.
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A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREDICTING RECIDIVISM
For nearly a century, social scientists have endeavored to predict recidi-
vism. Believing that objective indicia can operate as meaningful proxies
for recidivism risk, criminologists have attempted to develop accurate
and reliable assessment tools. But what should those tools look like?
How many variables should be included in risk assessment tools? Many?
Few? 113
The pioneering parole-prediction instrument developed by Ernest Bur-
gess employed twenty-two different variables, ranging from father's na-
tionality to psychiatric prognosis. 114 On the other hand, the early
instrument developed by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck employed only
seven factors. 115 Later, Lloyd Ohlin's model, included in the first pub-
lished parole manual, Selection for Parole: A Manual of Parole Predic-
tion, included twelve,1 6 the federal salient factor score, developed by
U.S. Parole Commission researchers, used nine, 17 and the Greenwood
scale, devised in 1982 to identify high crime defendants for possible selec-
tive incapacitation, used seven factors.11 8 Several key variables (e.g.,
work record, prior arrests, and psychiatric prognosis) were included in
most early parole-prediction instruments. Prior criminal history ap-
peared to be especially predictive." 9 After all, it was said that "[b]y and
large, the more crimes a man has committed, the more likely he is to
commit another.' 20
Many of these variables still appear in contemporary prediction mod-
els. For example, comparable variables appear in risk assessment instru-
ments such as the Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/
CMI), 2 1 Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), 122 Lifestyle Criminal-
113. Some researchers took the approach of including many unweighted variables;
others used just a few weighted variables. See HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 68 ("In all of
this research, the central battle lines were between the Burgess unweighted, multiple-factor
model and the Glueck weighted, few-factor model."). Significantly, Albert Reiss found
that the precision of parole-prediction tools improved as the number of variables de-
creased. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Accuracy, Efficiency, and Validity of a Prediction
Instrument, 56 AM. J. Soc. 552, 558 (1951).
114. Ernest Burgess, Factors Determining Success or Failure on Parole, in THE WORK-
INGS OF THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 221 (An-
drew A. Bruce et al. eds., 1928).
115. See SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS 281-83(1954) (1930).
116. LLOYD E. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE: A MANUAL OF PAROLE PREDICTION
51-53 (1951).
117. See Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor
Score, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 197 (1974).
118. See GREENWOOD, supra note 97, at vii, xv-xvi.
119. See HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 67 ("Other researchers were concluding around
that time that prior criminal history was the most predictive factor.").
120. Sam B. Warner, Factors Determining Parole from the Massachusetts Reformatory,
14 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172, 196 (1923).
121. DON ANDREWS ET AL., LEVEL OF SERVICE/CASE MANAGEMENT INVENTORY
(Multi-Health Systems 2004).
122. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAG-
ING RIsK 237-39 (1998) (outlining risk instrument).
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ity Screening Form (LCSF), 123 General Statistical Information on Recidi-
vism Scale (GSIR), a24 Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), 125 and the Risk Prediction Index
(RPI). a26 These variables also appear in actuarial instruments for sex of-
fenders, such as the Static-99,127 and in certain psychometric instruments
that have been related to recidivism, such as the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), 128 the psychopathic deviation (pd) scale of
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),129 and the
California Personality Inventory (CPI). 130 Many state specific risk instru-
ments use analogous variables, as well.131 The appendix, infra, reveals
that most available risk instruments assess many of the same variables.
Interestingly, of the hundreds of variables believed to be relevant in
sentencing, 32 a subset-perhaps a few dozen-appear in one form or an-
other on most of the instruments used to predict recidivism risk in adult
offenders. 133 But which of these variables are most predictive?
123. See Glenn D. Walters, Comparability of the Standard and Interview Versions of the
Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form, 33 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOL-
OGY 49, 54-56 (1989) (outlining form).
124. Jean Nuffield, The Statistical Information About Recidivism Scale: Some Reflec-
tions on Its Application, in USING RISK ASSESSMENTS TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM (1989),
available at www.csc-ssc.ga.ca/text/pblet/forum/eOl2/e0l2ind-eng.shtml. (describing devel-
opment of GSIR).
125. NORTHPOINTE INST. FOR PUB. MGMT., CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
PROFILING FOR ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS (1996).
126. See JAMES B. EAGLIN ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., RPI PROFILES: DESCRIPTIVE INFOR-
MATION ABOUT OFFENDERS BASED ON THEIR RPI SCORES 1-2 (1997), available at
ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/0009.pdf (describing development of RPI).
127. See R. KARL HANSON & ANDREW HARRIS, DYNAMIC PREDICTORS OF SEXUAL
RECIDIVISM 7-20 (1998). For a good summary of the case law on the Static-99, see gener-
ally Static 99 Clearinghouse, NYS Static-99 Case Law Summary, STATIC99.ORG, http://
www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static99caselawsummary.pdf (last visited Oc. 23, 2011).
128. ROBERT D. HARE, HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED (Multi-Health Sys-
tems 2002).
129. S. R. HATHAWAY & J.C. McKINLEY, MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY IN-
VENTORY 19-22 (1951). For efforts to relate the MMPI to future crime, see, e.g., Nathan G.
Mandel & Alfred J. Barron, The MMPI and Criminal Recidivism, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 35 (1966).
130. HARRISON G. GOUGH, CALIFORNIA PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY ADMINISTRA-
TOR'S GUIDE 53-76 (1987) (scales used as part of California Psychological Inventory).
131. See, e.g., ROBERT BARNOSKI & ELIZABETH K. DRAKE, WASHINGTON'S OFFENDER
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECnONS' STATIC RISK ASSESSMENT 2
(2007); OsROM ET AL., supra note 98, at 27 (describing Virginia's risk assessment instru-
ment); Michael A. Wolff, Missouri's Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 112-14 (2006) (describing Missouri's risk assessment instrument).
132. See JOANNA SHAPLAND, BETWEEN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 55 (1981) (identi-
fying 229 factors relevant to sentencing).
133. Many of these variables relate to a set of criminogenic needs referred to as the
"big six." See FAYE S. TAXMAN ET AL., TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO INCORPORAT.
ING SCIENCE INTO PRACTICE 28 exhibit 6 (2004), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/
2004/020095.pdf (identifying antisocial values, criminal peers, low self-control, dysfunc-
tional family ties, substance abuse, and criminal personality as key criminogenic needs that,
if unaddressed, will increase the likelihood of recidivism). Others refer to the "big four"
(antisocial associates, attitudes, personality, and criminal history) or the "central eight"
(the "big four" plus family/marital circumstances, school/work difficulties, antisocial lei-
sure/recreation, and substance abuse). E.g., ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 83, at 67-68,
276.
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In 1996, using meta-analytic techniques, Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little,
and Claire Goggins looked at 131 different studies to identify the static
and dynamic variables that appear to be most predictive of reoffend-
ing.134 The association between these variables and recidivism should not
be overstated, 135 and it should be noted that these variables operate at
the individual level (i.e., they do not look at neighborhood-level or na-
tional factors or consider the influence of the criminal justice system it-
self), but their analysis revealed seventeen different variables with
statistically significant relationships with recidivism. 136 Other meta-anal-
yses have identified similar variables as influential in offending.137 Com-
posite risk scales had a weighted Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient (z+) of .30.138 The strongest single predictor of recidivism was
having criminal companions, 139 with a weighted Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient (z') of .21.140 Also highly predictive were antiso-
cial personality (z' = .18),141 criminogenic needs (z' = .18),142 adult crimi-
nal history (z' = .17), 143 and race (z+= .17). 14 4
Several other variables appeared to be relevant, mid-range predictors
134. See Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 575. Interestingly, they concluded that dy-
namic factors were as effective at predicting recidivism as static factors. Id. at 588.
135. The predictive validity of these variables is modest. Correlation coeffecients (r
scores) range between .00 (no correlation) and 1.00 (perfect correlation). ANDREWS &
BONTA, supra note 83, at 7-8. An r of .20 or greater is viewed as practically important. See
Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 588. Given a minimal correlation coefficient (e.g., r =
.05), however, the corresponding area under the curve (AUC) statistic is only .53, or
slightly higher than random chance (AUC = .50). See ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 83,
at 271, 275 (converting between r and AUC statistics). The strongest single correlation in
Gendreau's analysis is .21, which equals an AUC value of about .61. Gendreau et al., supra
note 39, at 563 tbl.1; see also ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 83, at 275. Still, it would be
wrong to dismiss these variables just because they do not perfectly predict recidivism
(AUC = 1.0). See ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 83, at 275-76. Even the well-accepted
relationship between heart attacks and the combination of bad cholesterol, smoking, and
hypertension only produce AUC values in the .74-77 range. Id. at 276.
136. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 582-83.
137. See, e.g., Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, What Works for Female Offenders: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 438 (1999); Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews,
What Works in Young Offender Treatment: A Meta-Analysis, 11 F. CORREcrIoNs RES. 21
(1999); Craig Dowden et al., The Effectiveness of Relapse Prevention with Offenders: A
Meta-Analysis, 47 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 516 (2003) (all
associating similar variables with offending).
138. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1; see also ANDREWS & BONTA, supra
note 83, at 7.
139. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583, 597 (counting "identification/socialization
with other offenders" as indicia of criminal companions).
140. Id. at 583. A comparable meta-analysis of juvenile offending found that criminal
history was the strongest predictor of recidivism in that population. See Cindy C. Cottle et
al., The Prediction of Criminal Recidivism in Juveniles: A Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 367, 384-85 (2001).
141. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597 (counting the "MMPI Pd,
Megargee system, EPI-Psychoticism, CPI-Soc, PCL-R, DSM-I1 personality disorders, any
indices of egocentric thinking" as indicia of antisocial personality variables).
142. Id. (counting "antisocial attitudes supportive of an antisocial lifestyle and behavior
regarding employment, education").
143. Id. (counting "adult-prior arrest, probation, jail, conviction, incarceration, prison
misconducts" as indicia of adult criminal history).
144. Id. (counting "white vs. black/Hispanic/native").
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of recidivism: pre-adult antisocial behavior (z' = .16),145 family rearing
practices (z' = .14),146 social achievement (z' = .13),147 interpersonal con-
flict (z' = .12),148 and current age (z' = .11).149
Other variables were weak-but-significant predictors of recidivism:
substance abuse (z' = .10), 150 family structure (z = .09),151 intellectual
functioning (z' = .07),152 family criminality (z' = .07),153 gender (z' =
.06), 154 socio-economic status of origin (z' = .05),155 and personal distress
(z = .05).156
Judges employing these factors at sentencing would be on safe ground,
mostly. 157 Adult criminal history is a relatively uncontroversial measure,
after all, even among retributivists.158 Similarly, considerations of em-
ployment, which is an aspect of social achievement, engender little de-
bate. 159 But other variables would be problematic, either because they
145. Id. (counting "preadult-prior arrest, probation, jail, conviction, incarceration, al-
cohol/drug abuse, aggressive behavior, conduct disorder, behavior problems at home and
school, delinquent friends" as indicia of pre-adult antisocial behavior).
146. Id. (counting "lack of supervision and affection, conflict, abuse" as relevant indicia
of family rearing practices).
147. Id. (counting "marital status, level of education, employment history, income, ad-
dress changes" as indicia of social achievement).
148. Id. (counting "family discord, conflict with significant others" as indicia of inter-
personal conflict).
149. Id. (counting age "at time of data collection/assessment" as relevant variable).
150. Id. (counting "recent history of alcohol/drug abuse" as indicator of substance
abuse).
151. Id. (counting "separation from parents, broken home, foster parents" as indicia of
family structure).
152. Id. (counting "WAIS/WISC, Raven, Porteous Q score, learning disabilities, read-
ing level" as indicia of intellectual functioning).
153. Id. (counting "parents and/or siblings in trouble with the law" as indicia of family
criminality).
154. Id. (counting "[g]ender" as appropriate measure).
155. Id. (counting "socioeconomic status (SES) of parents (parental occupation, educa-
tion, or income)" as indicia of social class of origin).
156. Id. (counting "anxiety, depression, neuroticism, low self-esteem, psychiatric symp-
tomatology (i.e., psychotic episodes, schizophrenia, not guilty by reason of insanity, affec-
tive disorder), attempted suicide, personal inadequacy" as indicia of personal distress).
157. See Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual Criminals: An Ethi-
cal and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 699, 716 (2007) ("If a model could be crafted based only on these
criminologically-based variables [like past crimes, the nature of the instant offense, and
remorse], few would complain.").
158. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 66.
The criminal history score was designed to predict recidivism, but uses only
criminal history to do so (as opposed to also using employment or drug use
history, as had the Parole Commission's salient factor score). In this way, the
Commission sought to reduce the tension between preventing future crime
and just punishment for the current crime.
Id. at 15; see also Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 28, at 24 ("To minimize the tension
between the goals of just desert and incapacitation, the Commission chose to measure
recidivism risk based only on an offender's criminal history, on the theory that past of-
fenses also increase an offender's culpability.").
159. See Paul Gendreau et al., Case Needs Review: Employment Domain, CORREC-
TIONAL SERV. CAN., http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r90/r90_e.pdf (last visited
Oct. 23, 2011) ("Of all of the predictors of offender recidivism, the employment/education
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are difficult to evaluate, 160 or because they deal with constitutionally sus-
pect categories.1 61 Problematically, several variables that appear to be
significantly correlated with recidivism are constitutionally suspect: race,
age, gender, and socio-economic status.
In some ways, the situation appears to be a "two cultures" problem. 162
Criminologists use these variables in their models because they are pre-
dictive.1 63 For their purposes, it does not matter whether these character-
istics are deemed off-limits by constitutional scholars and lawyers. 164 But
the use of these variables may give those engaged in actual criminal sen-
tencing great pause. 165
The [risk] prediction instruments were generated, created, driven
by sociology and criminology. They came from the social sciences.
They were exogenous to the legal system. They had no root, nor any
relation to the jurisprudential theories of just punishment. They had
no ties to our long history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence-to centu-
ries of debate over the penal sanction, utilitarianism, or philosophical
theories of retribution. And yet they fundamentally redirected our
basic notion of how best and most fairly to administer the criminal
law.166
It very well may be that use of these variables should give sentencing
judges pause, but there is no doubt that, correctly applied, risk assess-
ment instruments can yield modest improvements in the precision of
judges adjudicating on utilitarian grounds. Although applying suspect
categories to sentencing decisions might make judges nervous, the vari-
ables identified in Gendreau's meta-analysis are rooted in a well estab-
lished body of social science research.' 67 Part III.B will describe some of
this work.
domain (hereafter known as employment) is probably the most prosaic. Indeed, it has
engendered little debate .... ).
160. For example, intellectual functioning and personal distress rely upon clinical as-
sessments. See, e.g., WISC-IV: CLINICAL ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 2E 4 (Aurelio
Prifitera et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008); TIMOTHY J. TRULL, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 122-23 (7th
ed. 2005).
161. For example, although race is correlated to recidivism as closely as adult criminal
history, race-based classifications are analyzed with strict scrutiny. See Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583.
162. Cf C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 4, 6
(Canto ed. 1993) (1959) (describing a breakdown of communication between literary intel-
lectuals and natural scientists).
163. See Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 579.
164. See Michael Tonry, Prediction and Classification: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 CRIME
& JUST. 367, 397 (1987) (noting however that "[mlany people believe it unjust to base
punishment decisions on factors over which the offender has no control").
165. See id. at 398.
166. HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 188.
167. See generally LEE ELLIS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF CRIME CORRELATES (2009);
JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985) (both
relating various social science factors to crime).
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B. CRIMINOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTOR VARIABLES
James Austin has noted that criminology is often irrelevant to policy,1
68
but Erik Luna has suggested that criminology could do much to inform
the criminal law. 169 This is particularly true with sentencing. Empirical
data can provide judges with essential information about the factors asso-
ciated with increased risks of future crime; research about these variables
can provide a theoretical context for understanding risk. Some of the
criminological literature for the seventeen variables identified as predic-
tive by Gendreau is summarized, infra.
1. Criminal Companions
The notion that criminal companions (z' = .21)170 might lead to crimi-
nal behavior lies at the heart of the theory of differential association. 17 1
In articulating this theory, criminologist Edwin Sutherland suggested that
criminal behavior is learned, like any other behavior, and is adopted prin-
cipally through contacts with intimate personal groups.172 Of course,
whether criminal peers cause crime, through reinforcement of criminal
attitudes and behaviors, or are selected as peers because of their pro-
criminal values remains unclear. 17 3 However, Gendreau's meta-analysis
did not attempt to disentangle causality, it only sought to establish the
correlation between recidivism and criminal companions.174 And that
correlation does exist.1 75 Indeed, differential association has found con-
siderable support in empirical research.176 For example, Travis Hirschi
acknowledged the fundamental importance of criminal peers among juve-
nile delinquents when he pithily observed, "[m]ost delinquent acts are
committed with companions; most delinquents have delinquent
168. See James Austin, Why Criminology Is Irrelevant, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y
557, 557 (2003).
169. See Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
71, 79 (2009).
170. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583.
171. See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOL-
OGY 81 (7th ed. 1966).
172. Id. at 79-82.
173. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 292-99 (noting that the direction of
causality between having criminal peers and crime is unknown).
174. See Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 579; H.J. EYSENCK, CRIME, AND PERSONAL-
ITY 206 (3d ed. 1977).
175. See Charles E. Grenier & George A. Roundtree, Predicting Recidivism Among
Adjudicated Delinquents: A Model to Identify High Risk Offenders, 12 J. OFFENDER COUN-
SELING SERVS. & REHABILITATION 101, 104, 107 (1987); Cindy L. Hanson et al., Demo-
graphic, Individual, and Family Relationship Correlates of Serious and Repeated Crime
Among Adolescents and Their Siblings, 52 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 528, 535(1984).
176. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 98, tbl.4.6.3a (summarizing literature support-
ing link between delinquent peers and crime); Charles R. Tittle, et al., Modeling Suther-
land's Theory of Differential Association: Toward an Empirical Clarification, 65 Soc.
FORCES 429 (1986) (noting that "[d]espite some important anomalies, our findings support
the major theme of Sutherland's thinking. Association with criminal definitions does seem
to be a generator of crime, and it appears to exercise its influence indirectly through its
effect on a learned symbolic construct-motivation to engage in criminal behavior.").
13532011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
friends. '177 The influence of criminal peers also appears to be important
among recidivating adults. While most adult crime is committed alone, 178
Reiss found that career offenders regularly engage in co-offending. 179
2. Criminogenic Needs
Gendreau and his colleagues reported a reasonably robust association
between antisocial attitudes and recidivism (z' = .18).18o Specifically,
their meta-analysis indicated that those who hold antisocial attitudes that
support antisocial lifestyles, dismissing pro-social values of employment
and education, are more likely to recidivate. For decades, criminologists
have understood that offenders frequently harbor antisocial attitudes and
hold antisocial values that allow them to engage in criminal behavior.1 81
Numerous studies have related antisocial attitudes with criminality. 182
Because of the strength of the relationship, some criminologists count
criminal values among the "big six" criminogenic needs; 183 others include
antisocial cognitions among the "big four" and "central eight" crimi-
nogenic needs.184
3. Antisocial Personality
Antisocial personality was also predictive of recidivism (z' = .18).185
Certain personality traits appear to be associated with crime, 186 and a
relationship has been posited between certain cognitive styles and offend-
ing.187 A number of personality dimensions appear to be especially cor-
177. TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 135 (rev. ed. 2002) (citations omit-
ted); see MARK WARR, COMPANIONS IN CRIME: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL CON-
DUCT 111 (2002).
178. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 292 (observing that "most juvenile
crime, unlike most adult crime, is committed by persons in groups").
179. See, e.g., Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Co-offending and Criminal Careers, 10 CRIME & JUST.
117, 123 (1988) (noting that career criminals often engage in co-offending as well as solo
crime).
180. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583.
181. See Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of
Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 664, 666 (1957) (suggesting that offenders self-justify crimi-
nal conduct through cognitive rationalizations).
182. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 139-50, 242 (summarizing studies relating
antisocial attitudes to criminal behavior).
183. See FAYE S. TAXMAN ET AL., supra note 133, at 28 exhibit 6 (listing "big six"
criminogenic needs).
184. See ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 83, at 67-68, 276 (listing "central eight" and
"big four" criminogenic needs).
185. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583.
186. See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 117-129; EYSENCK, supra note 172, at
135, 138-39; SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY 274-75 (1950); Joshua D. Miller & Donald Lynam, Structural Models of Personal-
ity and Their Relation to Antisocial Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review, 39 CRIMINOLOGY
765, 780 (2001) (all suggesting links between personality traits and crime).
187. See, e.g., STANTON E. SAMENOW, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND 12-14 (rev. ed.




related with criminal behavior: impulsivity, 188 low self-control, 189 and a
limited capacity for empathy.190 Indeed, a lack of empathy is the hall-
mark trait of the psychopath, 19' a class of persons dramatically over-
represented in the criminal justice system. 192 The diagnosis of an
antisocial personality disorder, 193 closely aligned with the concept of psy-
chopathy (as described by Hervey Cleckley,194 Robert Hare,195 Ronald
Blackburn,196 and Adrian Raine 197) is highly correlated with offending
behavior.198 It has been associated with recidivism.' 99
4. Adult Criminal History
Although there are policy pitfalls to be found even in something as
obviously tied to sentencing as criminal history,200 adult criminal history
188. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 204-205 ("Many of the correlates
of offending may relate to impulsiveness ....").
189. See MICHAEL R. GOTrFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME 85-120 (1990) (proposing low self-control as a key predictor of crime).
190. See GLUECK & GLUECK, supra note 186, at 240-41 (identifying, inter alia, "lack of
concern for others" as a personality trait of antisocial youth); Miller & Lynam, supra note
179.
191. See ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF PSY-
CHOPATHS AMONG Us 44 (1993).
192. See LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 164 (8th ed. 2003) ("Criminologists estimate
that 10 percent or more of all prison inmates display psychopathic tendencies."); ROBERT
I. SIMON, BAD MEN Do WHAT GOOD MEN DREAM 33 (1996) (reporting prevalence of
psychopathy as 3% among men, less than 1% among women, with population average of
2.8%, but noting that "[i]n certain prison populations, 75% of the inmates may have the
disorder"). The relationship between psychopathy and crime is so entangled that some
have criticized the concept. See, e.g., Glenn D. Walters, The Trouble with Psychopathy as a
General Theory of Crime, 48 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 133,
133 (2004) (noting that psychopathy is often used tautologically, is oversimplified, and is
applied via fundamental attribution error). Others, however, have lauded psychopathy as
being among the most useful approaches to the study of crime. See, e.g., Matt DeLisi,
Psychopathy Is the Unified Theory of Crime, 7 YOUTH VIOLENCE AND JUV. JUST. 256, 256
(2009) ("I argue that psychopathy is the unified theory of delinquency and crime and the
purest explanation of antisocial behavior."). While scores on measurement instruments
may be correlated with recidivism, it is not obvious that psychopathy is actually a disorder.
See Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 230 (1998)
(concluding that "psychopaths do not seem disordered").
193. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 649-50 (4th ed., 1994) (counting arrestable acts, deceitfulness, impul-
sivity, aggressiveness, reckless disregard for safety, irresponsibility, and lack of remorse
among those 18 or older as diagnostic criteria).
194. See HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (3d ed., 1953).
195. See HARE, supra note 191 (describing psychopaths).
196. See Blackburn, supra note 103, at 507 (reviewing psychopathy literature).
197. See ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS
A CLINICAL DISORDER 159 (1993) (surveying physiological literature on psychopathology).
198. See Seena Fazel & John Danesh, Serious Mental Disorder in 23,000 Prisoners: A
Systematic Review of 62 Surveys, 359 LANCET 545, 547-48 (2002) (finding that in a 12-
country survey of almost 23,000 prisoners, 47% of males and 21% of females were diag-
nosed with antisocial personality disorder).
199. See, e.g., David E. Smith & David D. Smith, Eysenck's Psychoticism Scale and
Reconviction, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 387, 387 (1977).
200. See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22
CRIME & JUST. 303, 322 (1997) (describing potential policy issues).
2011] 1355
SMU LAW REVIEW
is the staple of risk prediction. 20 1 As Spohn has written, "Studies of
judges' sentencing decisions reveal that these decisions are based first and
foremost on the seriousness of the offense and the offender's prior crimi-
nal record.... Offenders with more extensive criminal histories receive
more severe sentences than those with shorter criminal histories. 20 2
Criminal history may be especially attractive to judges because it real-
izes utilitarian penal objectives while finding its roots in retributivism.20 3
Gendreau's meta-analysis also found it to be a reasonably strong predic-
tor of recidivism (z' = .17).204 Furthermore, a "long arrest record" was
included in Gottfredson's empirically-derived measure of risk.20 5 This is
consistent with other research.206 After all, it has been said that "'noth-
ing predicts behavior like behavior.' "207 The U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion has suggested that the criminal history categories of the sentencing
guidelines, which categorize offenders by frequency, seriousness, and re-
cency of prior offenses, are highly predictive of future recidivism. 20 8 The
U.S. Parole Commission's salient factor score,20 9 counting forms of prior
criminal history for three of nine measured variables, is even more pre-
dictive of recidivism than the Commission's criminal history categories. 210
5. Race
Race was also identified as a reasonably strong predictor in Gendreau's
analysis. In fact, it was as correlated to recidivism as was adult criminal
history (z' = .17).211 Race was also identified as a variable in Gottfred-
son's empirically-derived measures of risk, 212 and it appeared as a signifi-
cant predictor in the initial development of the Virginia Criminal
201. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
202. CASSIA SPOHN, How Do JUDGES DECIDE? 86 (2d ed. 2009) (internal citations
omitted).
203. See supra note 158, and accompanying text.
204. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583.
205. Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 6 exhibit 6.
206. See Stephen D. Hart et al., Performance of Criminal Psychopaths on Selected
Neuropsychological Tests, 99 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 374 (1990) (correlating prior violent
offending and recidivism); Bill Luchansky et al., Treatment Readmissions and Criminal Re-
cidivism in Youth Following Participation in Chemical Dependency Treatment, 25 J. ADDIC-
TIVE DISEASES 87, 91 (2006) (reporting positive relationship between delinquency and
recidivism for teens in substance abuse treatment).
207. NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 101 (1980) (quoting W.C. Kvaraceus).
208. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 43 (1987) (noting that "the criminal history
score will demonstrate predictive power comparable to that of prediction instruments cur-
rently in use").
209. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 117, at 195 (describing the development of sali-
ent factor score).
210. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND THE U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION SALIENT
FACTOR SCORE 12 (2005) (finding the SFS to be significantly more predictive than the
CHC).
211. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1.
212. Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 5.
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Sentencing Commission's risk prediction instrument.213 However, it is
not directly assessed in any risk prediction instrument in general use.214
That race is associated with recidivism is unsurprising.2 15 Flowers has
observed, "Race and, to a lesser extent, ethnicity are among the strongest
predictors of crime involvement. '216 Certainly, it is associated with pun-
ishment. Whereas the overall U.S. incarceration rate is approximately
756 per 100,000 (the highest rate in the world-roughly five-to-twelve
times the rate of comparable industrialized nations),217 racial groups are
not incarcerated in the United States at equivalent rates. In fact, a 2007
study revealed that while U.S. whites are incarcerated at a rate of 412 per
100,000, Hispanics are incarcerated at a rate of 742 per 100,000, and Afri-
can-Americans are incarcerated at a rate of 2,290 per 100,000!218 In some
states, African-Americans are incarcerated at rates greater than 4,000 per
100,000.219 Although the explanation is debated,220 it is a fact that in the
213. Race was strongly significant in the analysis, but it was excluded from Virginia's
risk prediction instrument because it was viewed as a proxy for "economic deprivation,
inadequate educational facilities, family instability, and limited employment opportunities,
many of which disproportionately apply to the African-American population." OSTROM
ET AL., supra note 98, at 27-28.
214. Early risk instruments assessed nationality. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 114, at
221. Contemporary risk instruments no longer do so, but they do assess other variables
which co-vary meaningfully with race, such as socioeconomic status, education, or family
criminality. Criminal history is especially problematic. Consequently, while race may not
be measured directly, other risk variables may operate as a proxy for race. See Bernard E.
Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper, No.
535 (2010)), (forthcoming in CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y), www.law.vchicago.edu/files/
file535-323-6h-race.pdf; see also Petersilia & Turner, supra note 42 (noting the systematic
correlation of risk variables with race).
215. See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 20-32 (summarizing literature supporting
relationship between race and crime); Virginia McGovern et al., Racial and Ethnic Recidi-
vism Risks, 89 PRISON J. 309, 309 (2009) (analyzing Bureau of Justice statistics and conclud-
ing that in the three years after release from state and federal prisons in 1994, white
offenders had the lowest rate of recidivism, black offenders had the highest rate of recidi-
vism, and Hispanic offenders had a rate between black and white offenders).
216. RONALD BARRI FLOWERS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE CHARACTER-
ISTICS OF CRIME IN AMERICA 91 (1989).
217. See Roy WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST, 1 (2009), available at
www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th-41.pdf (reporting prison
populations worldwide).
218. See Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration by
Race and Ethnicity, THE SENT'G PROJECT, 4 (2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/rd stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.
219. Id. at 8 tbl.3.
220. See Alex R. Piquero & Robert W. Brame, Assessing the Race-Crime and Ethnic-
ity-Crime Relationship in a Sample of Serious Adolescent Delinquents, 54 CRIME & DE-
LINO. 390, 404 (2008) (comparing different explanations for higher levels of official
criminality among African Americans). One possibility is that there are genuine differ-
ences in the crime rate by race. See, e.g., J. Philippe Rushton, Race and Crime: An Interna-
tional Dilemma, 32 SOCIETY 37, 38 (1995) (suggesting that the biology of race is
meaningfully related to criminal behavior throughout the world); John Paul Wright, Incon-
venient Truths: Science, Race, and Crime, in BIOSOCIAL CRIMINOLOGY: NEW DIRECTIONS
IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 137, 144 (Anthony Walsh & Kevin M. Beaver eds., 2009) (not-
ing "the undeniable fact is that blacks commit more crime than any other group; and they
commit more violent crime than any other group"). But many self-report studies do not
report race-based differences in the frequency of offending. See, e.g., Ronald L. Akers et
al., Social Characteristics and Self-Reported Delinquency, in SOCIOLOGY OF DELINQUENCY
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U.S., minorities are arrested at higher rates than whites.221 While Afri-
can-Americans constitute approximately 12.9% of the general popula-
tion,222 they accounted for 50.1% of the 2008 arrests for murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, 223 32.2% of the arrests for forcible rape,224 and
56.7% of the arrests for robbery.225 In fact, African-Americans are dis-
proportionately arrested for all 29 listed offenses in the FBI's Uniform
Crime Reports except two: driving under the influence (10.0%) and li-
quor laws (11.5%).226 African-Americans are not only more likely to be
arrested, they are also more likely to be re-arrested. Indeed, a massive
body of research shows that African-Americans and Hispanics are more
likely to be re-arrested than whites.227 There may be sound reasons to
exclude race from risk prediction instruments,228 and contemporary risk
instruments do not include race as an explicit factor, but there is little
48 (Gary F. Jensen ed., 1981). If anything, some studies show that African American
youths report less delinquency and substance abuse than do white youths. See LLOYD D.
JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL RESULTS ON ADOLESCENT
DRUG USE (Institute for Social Research ed., 2000). This has led some commentators to
ask whether the source of higher African American arrest rates may lie in discrimination
within the criminal justice system. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 149-153 (1999) (discussing the diffi-
culties associated with establishing racial discrimination with empirical data). Because the
subject remains so charged in U.S. society, even asking how race relates to social problems
can be deeply contentious. See, e.g., Christopher F. Chabris, IQ Since "The Bell Curve",
COMMENT., 3 (1998), available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/-cfc/Chabrisl998a.html (not-
ing that Bell Curve co-author Richard Herrnstein's "lectures were filled with protesters,
and his speeches at other universities were canceled, held under police guard, or aborted
with last-second, back-door escapes into unmarked vehicles" and that "[d]eath threats
were made").
221. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2008, FBI.oov, http://
www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_.43.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2011) (identifying arrest
rates by race). The disparity in arrest rates may be even greater than it seems. Since the
Uniform Crime Reports use a four-category racial taxonomy (White, Black, American In-
dian or Alaskan Native, and Asian or Pacific Islander), the inclusion of Hispanics into the
category, White, may obscure differential treatment of Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites
in the criminal justice system. See Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and
Judges' Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145,
166-67 (2001) (noting that Hispanics are sentenced more severely than non-Hispanics and
that combining the groups masks racial differences in sentencing). In the federal system,
Latinos comprise 40% of those sentenced although they comprise just 13% of the general
population. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., A RISING SHARE: HISPANICS AND FEDERAL CRIME
(2009), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/104.pdf.
222. See JESSE MCKINNON, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2
(2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrOl-5.pdf (reporting 12.9%
of the U.S. population as black).




227. See, e.g., ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RE-
LEASED IN 1983, 1 (1997), available at http:/fbjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf;
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, 7
(2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf; McGovern et al.,
supra note 215 (all reporting recidivism rates higher for Blacks and Hispanics than non-
Hispanic whites).
228. See Netter, supra note 157 at 718. See generally infra Part IV (outlining practical,
legal, and philosophical obstacles to judicial consideration of suspect factors at sentencing).
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disputing that race operates as a robust predictor of re-arrest in modem
America.
6. Pre-Adult Antisocial Behavior
Further supporting the proposition that "nothing predicts behavior like
behavior, '229 Gendreau found that juvenile antisocial behavior was a rel-
evant, mid-range predictor of adult recidivism (z' = .16).230 It seems as if
some people with a propensity to break rules as children-and to be sanc-
tioned for it-go on to break laws as adults and to be sanctioned for it.231
There is a. considerable body of work indicating that juvenile delinquents
are more likely to engage in adult crime.232 For example, in analyzing
fifteen longitudinal studies of offending across the life course, Elaine Eg-
gleston and John Laub found that more than half of juvenile delinquents
went on to become adult offenders. 233 Some researchers have reported
even higher rates among males released from juvenile facilities, with
more than eighty percent of releases later classified as adult offenders.234
In fact, the relationship between juvenile offending and adult offending is
so robust that many criminologists have questioned whether adult-onset
criminality is a genuine phenomenon. 235
7. Family Rearing Practices
Gendreau also found that family rearing practices was a relevant, mid-
range predictor of adult recidivism (z' = .14).236 There is a substantial
body of work reporting a relationship between the extent of parental su-
pervision and offending. "[N]early all of these studies have concluded
that as the degree of supervision monitoring increases, involvement of
229. WALKER, supra note 207.
230. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583.
231. Of course, it is possible that juveniles who are identified as delinquent by legal
authorities are labeled as such, and are more likely to be arrested as adult offenders either
because of self-fulfilling prophesy or because the label invites heightened police attention.
This idea lies behind the labeling theory. See, e.g., HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS:
STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963) ("Deviance is not a quality of the act
the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and
sanctions to an 'offender."').
232. See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 3-6 (identifying studies supporting rela-
tionship between officially detected delinquency and adult offenses).
233. See Elaine P. Eggleston & John H. Laub, The Onset of Adult Offending: A Ne-
glected Dimension of the Criminal Career, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 603, 604 (2002).
234. See, e.g., Michael E. Ezell & Lawrence E. Cohen, Crime over the Life Course: The
Empirical Implications of Three Theories, in DESISTING FROM CRIME: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN LONG-TERM CRIME PATTERNS OF SERIOUS CHRONIC OFFENDERS 12 (Michael
E. Ezell & Lawrence E. Cohen eds., 2005).
235. See, e.g., WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 97 (describing adult-onset criminality as
rare); TERRIE E. MOFFITT ET AL., SEX DIFFERENCES IN ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR: CON-
DUCT DISORDER, DELINQUENCY, AND VIOLENCE IN THE DUNEDIN LONGITUDINAL STUDY
88 (2001) (noting that the "onset of antisocial behaviour after adolescence is extremely
rare"); Tara Renae McGee & David P. Farrington, Are There Any True Adult-Onset Of-
fenders?, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 530, 545 (2010).
236. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
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offspring in crime and delinquency decreases." 237 Similarly, where family
relationships are conflicted, crime and delinquency appear to be more
prevalent. This finding has been replicated in the United States,238 Brit-
ain,239 and New Zealand. 240 Where there is actual neglect or abuse in the
family, rates of delinquency and adult criminality are also elevated,2 41 al-
though it is possible that race may affect the strength of this relation-
ship.242 Given the robust effect of intra-family conflicts on offending, it
should come as no surprise that negative family rearing practices are also
associated with recidivism.
8. Social Achievement
Social achievement, a composite measure of variables including marital
status, level of education, employment history, and income, appears to be
another relevant, mid-range predictor of adult recidivism (z' = .13).243
Flowers writes, "[t]he evidence suggests that there exists a strong correla-
tion between involvement in crime and the variables of employment, in-
come, education, and marital status. '"244 Most of the criminological
literature indicates that, all things being equal, married people exhibit
lower rates of offending than unmarried people.245 Recidivism research
produces the same result: married offenders are less likely to reoffend. 246
Like marriage, education is negatively associated with offending.247
237. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 93.
238. See, e.g., Gustavo Carlo et al., The Multiplicative Relations of Parenting and Tem-
perament to Prosocial and Antisocial Behaviors in Adolescence, 18 J. EARLY ADOLES-
CENCE 266, 274 (1998).
239. See David P. Farrington et al., Long-Term Criminal Outcomes of Hyperactivity-
Impulsivity-Attention Deficit and Conduct Problems in Childhood, in STRAIGHT AND DEVI-
OUS PATHWAYS FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADULTHOOD 62 (Lee N. Robins & Michael Rutter
eds., 1990).
240. See MoI'rmr ET AL., supra note 235.
241. See, e.g., Debra L. Foley et al., Childhood Adversity, Monoamine Oxidase A Geno-
type, and Risk for Conduct Disorder, 61 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 738, 741 (2004);
Candace Kruttschnitt et al., Abuse-Resistant Youth: Some Factors that May Inhibit Violent
Criminal Behavior, 66 Soc. FORCES 501, 513 (1987); Michael G. Maxfield & Cathy Spatz
Widom, The Cycle of Violence: Revisited 6 Years Later, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADO-
LESCENT MED. 390, 393 (1996) (all reporting relationship between abuse and offending).
242. See Candace Kruttschnitt & Maude Dornfeld, Childhood Victimization, Race, and
Violent Crime, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEtrAv. 448, 448 (1991) (noting significant association
between abuse and offending for white subjects but finding the relationship to be statisti-
cally insignificant for black subjects).
243. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
244. FLOWERS, supra note 216, at 113.
245. See, e.g., John H. Laub et al., Trajectories of Change in Criminal Offending: Good
Marriages and the Desistance Process, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 225, 225-26, 237 (1998); Robert J.
Sampson et al., Does Marriage Reduce Crime?: A Counterfactual Approach to Within-Indi-
vidual Causal Effects, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 465, 498-99 (2006).
246. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATH-
WAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 248-49 (1993); Rudolf H. Moos et al., Rates
and Predictors of Four-Year Readmission Among Late-Middle-Aged and Older Substance
Abuse Patients, 55 J. SToD. ON ALCOHOL 561, 562, 566, 568 (1994).
247. See, e.g., Yossi Shavit & Arye Rattner, Age, Crime, and the Early Life Course, 93
AM. J. Soc. 1457, 1468 (1988); Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Effect of Dropping Out of
High School on Subsequent Criminal Behavior, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 16-17 (1985).
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"[T]he vast majority of studies have concluded that as an individual's
years of education increase, his or her probability of criminal behavior
decreases. '2 48 Similar research has demonstrated a negative relationship
between education and recidivism: those with greater education are less
likely to reoffend. 249 Work also appears to play an important role in in-
hibiting crime. Frequent unemployment and frequent job changes are
both positively associated with offending, 250 and both are positively asso-
ciated with recidivism.251 Income matters, too. Sociologically-oriented
criminologists often focus on poverty as an explanation for crime,2 52 and
that explanation is borne out by a significant body of research.253
9. Interpersonal Conflict
Interpersonal conflict, marked by family discord or conflict with signifi-
cant others, is another mid-range predictor of adult recidivism (z' =
.12).254 A substantial body of research has shown a positive relationship
between discordant family relationships and offending255 and indicated
that delinquents have fewer friends than do non-delinquents: "[s]tudies
have unanimously concluded that delinquents have fewer friends than do
their relatively nondelinquent peers. '2 56 Criminologists have reported
that the relationship between family discord and offending also relates to
recidivism: people who are reared in families marked by high levels of
conflict and argument are more likely to reoffend. 257
10. Current Age
Gendreau's meta-analysis also indicated that age at the time of risk
assessment is a mid-range predictor of adult recidivism (z' = .11).258
Many criminologists have written about the link between age and
248. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 36.
249. George A. Roundtree et al., A Study of the Personal Characteristics of Probation-
ers as Related to Recidivism, 8 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING 53 (1984).
250. See David P. Farrington et al., Unemployment, School Leaving, and Crime, 26
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 335 (1986) (asserting positive relationship between unemployment
and crime).
251. See Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 84, at 243 (relating job stability to
parole success).
252. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 36 ("Many of the most popular theories of
criminal behavior have focused on poverty as a major causal factor.").
253. See, e.g., id.; Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Work, 25 CRIME &
JUST. 225 (1999) (noting that crime rates are inversely related to expected legal wages).
254. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
255. See, e.g., Scott W. Henggeler et al., Mother-Son Relationships of Juvenile Felons, 53
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 942, 942-43 (1985); Joan McCord, Some Child-
Rearing Antecedents of Criminal Behavior in Adult Men, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1477, 1484-85 (1979).
256. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 98.
257. See, Ruth P. Cox, An Exploration of the Demographic and Social Correlates of
Criminal Behavior Among Adolescent Males, 19 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 17, 21 (1996);
Michael J. Power et al., Delinquency and the Family, 4 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 13, 32 (1974);
(both reporting positive association between family discord and recidivism).
258. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
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crime,259 prompting Flowers to write, "[t]he demographic correlate most
strongly associated with crime is age."'2 60 Siegel has concurred, observing
that "[t]here is general agreement that age is inversely related to crimi-
nality. '2 61 Further, Hirschi and Gottfredson noted, "[a]ge is everywhere
correlated with crime." 262 Of course, the relationship between age and
crime is not linear; very young children rarely commit crimes.263 Rather,
the relationship between age and crime is curvilinear, with the highest
rates of arrest for property crime occurring at age sixteen (and dropping
to half of the apex by age twenty), and the highest rates of violent crime
occurring at age eighteen. 264 Those between the ages of about fifteen or
sixteen and twenty-four or twenty-five appear to be at greatest risk of
offending,265 but after that period, for a variety of possible reasons, adults
gradually "age out" of crime.266
11. Substance Abuse
Gendreau's meta-analysis indicated that a recent history of drug abuse,
alcohol abuse, or both is a weak, but still statistically significant, predictor
of adult recidivism (z' = .10).267 A wealth of criminological studies have
identified a series of complex linkages between alcohol, drugs, and
offending.268
The relationship of drug use/abuse and criminal behavior
manifests itself in several ways. Foremost perhaps is the possession
and use of drugs and alcohol where prohibited by law. This has a
wide-ranging effect, since it can involve both legal and illegal drugs
as well as drugs (such as alcohol) that are legal for adult users but
illegal for minors. Second, drug use can act as a precipitating corre-
late of violent or serious behavioral patterns. Third, drug users may
resort to economic crime as a means to support their habit. A final
association between crime and drug use is drug dealing and the often
high financial stakes, violence, and other crimes involved in the illicit
drug trade.2 69
259. See generally, e.g., WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 126-47; David P.
Farrington, Age and Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1986); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottf-
redson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552 (1983) (all reporting a strong
inverse relationship between age and crime).
260. FLOWERS, supra note 216, at 63.
261. LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 67 (8th ed. 2003).
262. Hirschi & Gottfredson, supra note 261, at 581.
263. See SIEGEL, supra note 254, at 67.
264. See id. (reporting FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics).
265. See GOTIFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 189, at 263. In their book, A General
Theory of Crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi imagine how age might be used in a system of
selective incapacitation. See id. at 263-65. Of course, the principle of age-based incapaci-
tation has no obvious stopping point, leading Harcourt to caution: "Taken to its extreme,
the incapacitation argument favors full incarceration of, say, the entire male population
between the ages of 16 and 24. That, of course, is absurd-or at least, should be absurd."
HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 31.
266. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 143.
267. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
268. See, e.g., FLOWERS, supra note 216, at 125-38.
269. Id. at 125.
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Summarizing the data that relates alcohol to offending, Ellis and his
colleagues note, "The evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion
that alcohol use and criminality are positively correlated. '270 There is
also research establishing a positive relationship between alcoholism and
offending,271 and a body of research indicating an association between
alcohol use, alcoholism and recidivism.272 The use of illegal drugs is by
definition criminal, but it has also been linked to both juvenile and adult
offending273 and to adult recidivism. 274
12. Family Structure
Gendreau's meta-analysis indicated that separation from parents, bro-
ken homes, and placement with foster parents was a weak, but still statis-
tically significant, predictor of adult recidivism (z+ = .09).275 The research
on the association between one-parent homes and crime is mixed, with
many studies indicating a positive relationship between broken homes
and delinquency but other studies that reveal no such relationship. 276 As
a general matter, however, the bulk of criminological research indicates
that children raised in one-parent homes are more likely to engage in acts
of delinquency and crime. This makes intuitive sense; "if one parent must
do the work of two, then, at the margin, less of that work will get
done.... Thus, we should expect to find more delinquency among some
kinds of broken homes. '277 Being raised in a one-parent home is associ-
ated with recidivism, as well.278 Ellis and his colleagues summarize the
research on one-parent homes and crime thusly:
Whether children are reared by a single parent or by both parents
living together in the same household inticates [sic] the intactness of
the parent's marital bond. Nonintact families (or broken homes) are
most often the result of divorce or separation, although the death of
one parent is also a cause. Research concerned with links between
broken homes and officially identified offending . . . reveal that
270. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 129-30.
271. See, e.g., Demmie Mayfield, Alcoholism, Alcohol, Intoxication and Assaultive Be-
havior, 37 DISEASES NERVOUS Sys. 288, 290-91 (1976).
272. See, e.g., Melvin S. Heller & Saundra M. Ehrlich, Actuarial Variables in 9,600 Vio-
lent and Non-Violent Offenders Referred to a Court Psychiatric Clinic, 4 AM. J. Soc. Psy-
CHIATRY 30, 33-35 (1984) (reporting positive association between alcohol use and
recidivism).
273. See, e.g., Joseph E. Jacoby et al., Nat'l Comm'n on Marijuana & Drug Abuse, Drug
Use and Criminality in a Birth Cohort, in 1 DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPEC-
TIVE app. 300, 342 (1973) (reporting positive relationship between illegal drug use and
delinquency); Duane C. McBride & Clyde B. McCoy, Crime and Drug-Using Behavior: An
Areal Analysis, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 281, 281-82, 297-98 (1981) (reporting association be-
tween illegal drug use and criminality).
274. See, e.g., Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, Recidivism Among Released Federal
Prisoners: Salient Factor Score and Five-Year Follow-Up, 12 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 501,
505-06 (1985) (linking drug use and recidivism).
275. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
276. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 245-47.
277. Id. at 249.
278. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 85 tbl.4.4.11a.
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crime and delinquency are higher among persons who come from
broken homes than those who come from intact families.279
The research about whether being raised by a mother is more or less
likely to lead to delinquency than being raised by a father remains equiv-
ocal,280 but the limited research on the subject suggests that residing with
neither parent is also associated with increased levels of crime.281
13. Intellectual Functioning
Intellectual functioning, an aggregate measure consisting of IQ scores,
learning disabilities, and reading levels, was identified as another weak,
but still significant, predictor of adult recidivism (z' = .07).282 This, too, is
unsurprising, as many criminologists have asserted a strong relationship
between below-average intellectual ability and offending.283 Indeed, the
relationship between low IQ and offending among young people has
been characterized as "one of the most robust findings across numerous
studies of juvenile delinquency. '284 More than 100 studies have ex-
amined whether a link between grades and offending exists, and most of
these have reported a significant association.285 Furthermore, a relation-
ship exists between low grades and recidivism.286 Below-average IQ
scores have been related to offending, as well.287 Those with IQ scores
about eight points below the population average are more likely to en-
gage in criminal conduct than those at the population average,288 and a
substantial body of work has indicated positive relationships between low
IQ and delinquency, 28 9 adult offending,290 and recidivism. 291
279. Id. at 84.
280. See id. at 88.
281. See id. at 84.
282. Gendreau et at., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
283. See generally, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 235-51 (1994); WILSON
& HERRNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 148-72; Travis Hirschi & Michael J. Hindelang, Intelli-
gence and Delinquency: A Revisionist Review, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 571 (1977) (all asserting
negative relationship between intelligence and crime).
284. Donald Lynam et al., Explaining the Relation Between IQ and Delinquency: Class,
Race, Test Motivation, School Failure, or Self-Control?, 102 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 187,
187 (1993).
285. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 150-51.
286. See Anthony Meade, Seriousness of Delinquency, the Adjudicative Decision and
Recidivism: A Longitudinal Configuration Analysis, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 478,
484 (1973).
287. See Hirschi & Hindelang, supra note 283, at 584.
288. See id. at 581, 584.
289. See, e.g., GLUECK & GLUECK, supra note 186; Lynam et al., supra note 284, at
193-94.
290. See, e.g., David P. Farrington, Childhood Origins of Teenage Antisocial Behaviour
and Adult Social Dysfunction, 86 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 13, 15-16.
291. See, e.g., Paul Richter et al., Forecasting Recidivism in Delinquency by Intelligence
and Related Constructs, 36 MED. Sci. & L. 337, 339-41 (1996); Hdkan Stattin et al., Per-
sonal Resources as Modifiers of the Risk for Future Criminality, 37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY




Family criminality was identified as another weak, but still significant,
predictor of adult recidivism (z' = .07).292 Early theorists believed that
crime ran in deviant families.293 After all, it is said that "the acorn does
not fall far from the tree. '2 94 And while there are thorny and unan-
swered questions about the relative contributions of environmental, bio-
logical, psychological, genetic, and social influences on crime,29 5 research
consistently indicates that criminal parents are more likely to raise crimi-
nal children than non-criminal parents.2 96 Indeed, some researchers have
argued that parental criminality is the strongest family-related variable in
predicting a child's likelihood of involvement in serious delinquency or
crime.2 97 The effect of parental criminality can be profound. In the long
running Cambridge Youth Survey, about 8% of boys with non-criminal
fathers became chronic offenders, but 37% of boys with criminal fathers
did so. 298 Family criminality has also been associated with recidivism:
those with criminal parents are more likely to reoffend than those with-
out criminal parents.2 99
15. Gender
Gender, too, was identified as another weak, but still significant, pre-
dictor of adult recidivism in Gendreau's meta-analysis (z' = .06).300 A
substantial body of criminological research indicates that men are signifi-
cantly more likely to engage in criminal conduct (especially serious crimi-
nal conduct) than women.301 "The evidence indicates that sex is a
significant factor in crime, and that males commit considerably more
criminal acts than females. ' 30 2 Whether criminologists measure crime
with official (arrest) statistics, victimization studies, or self-report studies,
data suggest that males are more criminal than females. 30 3 Both biologi-
292. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
293. SIEGEL, supra note 261 at 147.
294. See, e.g., id. at 148.
295. See id.
296. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein et al., Delinquency Careers: Innocents, Desisters, and
Persisters, 6 CRIME & JUST. 187, 197-98 (1985).
297. MICHAEL RUTTER & HENRI GILLER, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: TRENDS AND PER-
SPEC-rIVES 180, 182, 186-87 (1984); see also T. FERGUSON, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT IN
His SOCIAL SETrING: A GLASGOW STUDY 67 (1952).
298. See SIEGEL, supra note 261, at 148.
299. See Lee N. Robins et al., Arrests and Delinquency in Two Generations: A Study of
Black Urban Families and Their Children, 16 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 125,
139-40 (1975); S. G. Osborn & D. J. West, Conviction Records of Fathers and Sons Com-
pared, 19 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 120, 127 (1979).
300. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
301. See, e.g., THOMAS GABOR, THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR: STATISTI-
CAL APPROACHES 28 (1986) ("Cross-national evidence indicates that men are far more
likely to engage in criminal activity than are women and that this imbalance becomes more
pronounced with the increased gravity of criminal conduct."); WILSON & HERRNSTEIN,
supra note 167, at 114-15.
302. FLOWERS, supra note 216, at 77.
303. See SIEGEL, supra note 261, at 68.
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cal and social factors may play a role in explaining this difference, 30 4 but
the male and female crime gap appears to be an international phenome-
non: "in all societies, males are more likely to be identified as criminals
by the criminal justice system. '30 5 Most published studies also indicate
that males are more likely to recidivate than females. 30 6
16. Socio-Economic Status of Origin
Socio-economic status of origin-a measure reflecting parental educa-
tion, occupation, and income-is another weak, but still significant, pre-
dictor of adult recidivism (z' = .05).307 Ellis and his colleagues report that
"there is a negative relationship between parental status and offspring
criminality except possibly in the case of overall self-reported delin-
quency, where the findings have been mixed. '308 One study linking pa-
rental education to delinquency found that a father's level of education
was negatively correlated with offending (i.e., as a father's educational
level increased, offending behavior decreased), but did not identify a sig-
nificant association between a mother's education levels and offending. 30 9
This study also reported a negative relationship between parental income
and delinquency: as parents' incomes increased, offending decreased. 310
Studies have also reported a negative relationship between the status of
parents' occupations and delinquency: as status increased, levels of delin-
quency and crime decreased. 311
17. Personal Distress
Finally, personal distress-evidence of psychiatric disorder-appeared
in Gendreau's meta-analysis as another weak, but still significant, predic-
tor of adult recidivism (z' = .05).312 The question of whether there is an
association between mental illness and crime is controversial, 313 and the
findings are often contradictory. 314 Ellis and his colleagues summarized
the extant research: "the vast majority of studies have found a significant
positive relationship between mental illness and officially detected in-
304. See id. at 68-69.
305. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 13.
306. See, e.g., Roderick G. Broadhurst & Ross A. Mailer, The Recidivism of Prisoners
Released for the First Time: Reconsidering the Effectiveness Question, 23 AUSTL. & N.Z. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 88, 89, 102 (1990); Kevin I. Minor et al., Predictors of Juvenile Court Actions
and Recidivism, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 328, 337-38 (1997).
307. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tbl.1, 597.
308. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 37-38.
309. DAVID P. FARRINGTON & KATE A. PAINTER, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN OFFEND-
ING: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK-FOCUSED PREVENTION 50 (2002).
310. Id. at 32, 42, 49, 50.
311. See, e.g., P. Rantakallio et at., Juvenile Offenders, with Special Reference to Sex
Differences, 30 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 113, 116-17 (1995);
Paula Rantakallio et al., Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy and Delinquency of the Off-
spring: An Association Without Causation?, 21 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1106, 1109 (1992).
312. Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 583 tb.1, 597.
313. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 162.
314. See SIEGEL, supra note 261, at 161.
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volvement in criminal/delinquent behavior. '315 Statistics indicate that
mentally ill offenders are disproportionately arrested and convicted,
316
and most studies indicate a positive relationship between mental illness
and self-reported offending. 317 McManus and his colleagues reported a
positive correlation between subclinical depression and recidivism, 318 al-
though other researchers have concluded that it is not mental illness that
leads mentally ill offenders to recidivate, but other risk factors such as
criminal history, substance abuse, or family rearing practices. 3
1 9
To recapitulate, Gendreau's meta-analysis identified seventeen discrete
variables that appeared to be significantly associated with recidivism. In
descending order of strength of association, they are: (1) criminal com-
panions, (2) criminogenic needs, (3) antisocial personality, (4) adult crim-
inal history, (5) race, (6) pre-adult antisocial behavior, (7) family rearing
practices, (8) social achievement, (9) interpersonal conflict, (10) current
age, (11) substance abuse, (12) intellectual functioning, (13) family struc-
ture, (14) criminality, (15) gender, (16) socio-economic status of origin,
and (17) personal distress. 320
Of course, these seventeen variables do not operate in isolation. They
interact. For example, adult criminal history operates, at least in part, as
a function of age.32 1 It also may be meaningfully associated with race.
322
In one way or another, many of the variables correlated with recidivism
are also correlated with social disadvantage. 323
Using regression analysis, criminologists can try to disentangle the in-
fluence of the seventeen variables from each other, but in practice, social
315. ELLIS ET AL., supra note 167, at 162.
316. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Criminal Defendants with Psychiatric Impairment:
Prevalence, Probabilities and Rates, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 352, 368-69 (1993).
317. See, e.g., Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients
Reconsidered, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 275 (1992).
318. See Michael McManus et al., Psychiatric Disturbance in Serious Delinquents, 23 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 602, 612 (1984).
319. See James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among
Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123 (1998).
320. Gendreau, supra note 39.
321. See Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Inextricable Link Between
Age and Criminal History in Sentencing, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 156, 157 (2007) (noting that
older people have had more time to accumulate criminal history events and that, therefore,
two offenders with identical criminal history may not be identical in terms of either culpa-
bility or crime control interests).
322. See Harcourt, supra note 214.
323. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission decided to omit race from its risk
assessment instrument on the grounds that race was highly correlated with social and eco-
nomic disadvantage. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 98, at 27-28. It did not, however,
strike gender from the instrument, even though women earn lower wages than men and
enjoy less professional status than men. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
WOMEN'S EARNINGS: FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD BETTER MONITOR THEIR PERFORM-
ANCE IN ENFORCING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS; REP. GAO-08-799 (2008) (reporting
that in 2000, after controlling for experience, education, work conditions, and
demographics, women earned only eighty percent of what men earned). Netter asks, "[I]s
race the only demographic variable that affects, for example, employment prospects?
Characteristics such as ethnicity and religion have both permissible and impermissible
covariates. They deserve the same treatment as race." Netter, supra note 157, at 718.
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problems often cluster (e.g., individuals with limited intellectual function-
ing often enjoy low social achievement; individuals with many criminal
peers often have significant histories of juvenile antisocial behavior and
adult crime). Those who are interested in evidence-based sentencing
must proceed with caution; even if a statistically-meaningful variable is
eliminated from a risk assessment instrument on principle (e.g., removing
race from the Virginia instrument), that variable may continue to exert
gravity upon the remaining variables (e.g., criminal history, social
achievement, or socio-economic status of origin).
While the seventeen variables identified in Gendreau's meta-analysis
represent a substantial body of criminological research and indicate key
characteristics that are predictive of recidivism, employing those variables
in evidence-based sentencing decisions may prove difficult. Some vari-
ables will be difficult for courts to know (e.g., ascertaining intellectual
functioning may require clinical assessment). In addition to logistical
challenges, courts may face legal challenges. Due process claims and
equal protection challenges may limit the ability of judges to rely on cer-
tain types of data in sentencing decisions. Suspect variables may or may
not survive strict scrutiny analysis. Philosophical concerns may present
challenges, too. Using group statistics to sentence individual defendants
may seem unfair to sentencing judges, like "justice" from the film Minor-
ity Report.324 And while some characteristics may justify enhanced pun-
ishment on utilitarian grounds, these same traits might make the
imposition of punishment problematic on retributivist grounds. These
challenges to evidence-based sentencing will be described in more detail
in Part IV.
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF EMPIRICAL VARIABLES
IN EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
Courts hoping to draw upon Gendreau's meta-analysis (and the vast
body of criminological research upon which it is founded) may face three
distinct kinds of challenges: logistical (since, to be effective, evidence-
based sentencing requires data that are both accurate and relevant), legal
(since certain characteristics, while arguably germane to sentencing, may
be off limits), and philosophical (since imposing punishments by using
group statistics may seem unjust, and since factors that might exculpate
the defendant under a retributivist calculus can operate as risk factors
within a utilitarian framework). Each of these challenges will be dis-
cussed, in turn, infra.
A. LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES
Evidence-based sentencing is fundamentally empirical. Instead of sen-
tencing by clinical judgment and intuition, or with sentencing guidelines
(that may or may not be founded upon data), evidence-based sentencing
324. MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks 2002).
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uses empirical data to impose criminal sentences. But while some infor-
mation related to Gendreau's seventeen variables would be relatively
easy for a court to obtain and would prove to be relatively reliable (e.g.,
the defendant's age at the time of sentencing, gleaned from official
records), obtaining other reliable data relevant to sentencing may prove
problematic.
How, for example, should a court ascertain a defendant's association
with criminal peers (the variable that Gendreau's me'ta-analysis identified
as most predictive of adult recidivism)? Several approaches are possible.
First, the court can simply ask the defendant. But the defendant may not
know. Criminality is not an observable personal characteristic like height
or weight, and it is entirely possible that many of the defendant's friends
have committed felonies without his knowledge. 325 And even if the de-
fendant somehow does know exactly how many of his friends are criminal
peers, he is unlikely to reveal this information (unless the number is
zero). Because the number of criminal peers is positively associated with
risk (and because greater numbers of criminal peers thereby legitimate
more invasive punishments),32 6 it is simply not in the defendant's interest
to provide this information to the court. It makes far more sense for the
defendant to remain silent, avoiding the risk of self-incrimination. 327 The
burden to ascertain the number of criminal peers, then, will fall upon the
court. The court might rely upon official documents such as the defen-
dant's arrest record (identifying "known associates"), but reliance upon
these documents is problematic, possibly telling the court more about the
operations of the criminal justice system than about the number of crimi-
nal peers a defendant actually knows. 328 A first-time offender, having no
police record, will have no listed "known associates," even if he has hun-
dreds-thousands-of criminal peers. Similarly, an offender whose crim-
inal peers have avoided detection will have no listed "known associates,"
even though these individuals exert the same criminogenic influence as
those with extensive criminal records. Inadvertent recording errors, in-
tentionally introduced bias, and the unconscious skewing of subjective
facts by actors in the justice system further complicate the problem.
325. See James S. Wallerstein & Clement J. Wyle, Our Law-Abiding Law-Breakers, 25
PROBATION 107 (1947) (noting that most randomly-selected New Yorkers reported having
committed at least one felony offense).
326. Of course, in sentencing a high-risk defendant, a judge may use this information to
impose sentencing conditions (e.g., requiring substance-abuse programs to be completed or
increasing the number of face-to-face meetings with a probation officer) instead of increas-
ing the term of imprisonment. Too much should not be made of this distinction, however.
While rehabilitation programs and enhanced supervision may be in the defendant's ulti-
mate interest, they too-just like an increased term of imprisonment-are an imposition
upon the defendant's liberty.
327. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (holding that imposing an
increased sentence because of adverse inferences drawn from a defendant's silence vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination).
328. See John I. Kitsuse & Aaron V. Cicourel, A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics,
11 Soc. PROBS. 131, 133 (1963-1964) (suggesting that official crime statistics may tell more
about police and prosecutorial practices than the prevalence of crime).
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Official documentation is only as good as the information recorded
within it, and because the path between an offense and an official record
is mediated by numerous discretionary decision points,329 some offenders
with many criminal peers will not seem to know any criminal associates,
while others with few or none will appear to be surrounded by offenders.
A court, recognizing the limitations inherent in official documents, might
choose to gather its own, independent information. Conceivably, a court
could direct a probation officer to gather objective information about a
given defendant's criminal peers. Yet even this solution is not as straight-
forward as it seems, since the defendant, after being found guilty, will
probably modify his behavior before sentencing. The professional drug
trafficker will avoid any contact with illegal substances; the racketeer will
leave crime business to others in his syndicate. Defendants will adapt to
changing circumstances. Obtaining an accurate count of criminal peers at
this late stage in the criminal proceedings is doomed. Thus, measuring
even a straightforward variable like the number of criminal peers may
prove problematic for evidence-based courts.
It is not only defendants between arrest and sentencing who will
change their behavior. Other actors in the criminal justice system will
adapt their behavior to evidence-based sentencing, too, with conse-
quences that can be difficult to anticipate. Offenders do not operate in a
vacuum, but commit crimes in light of expected consequences. The ac-
tions of police officers, prosecutors, and judges, then, shape behaviors.330
For example, if risk assessment instruments suggest that offenders with
certain traits are more likely to offend, law enforcement officers might
reasonably decide to focus their limited resources on suspects with those
traits. This use of heuristics is the logic of profiling.331 Focusing re-
sources on individuals with high-risk traits will increase the proportion of
arrests made among offenders with those traits (vis-A-vis offenders with-
out those traits), and will increase the proportion of offenders with high-
risk traits in prison. This may create self-fulfilling prophesies: "Criminal
profiling, when it works, is a self-confirming prophesy. It aggravates over
time the perception of a correlation between the group trait and
crime." 332 Of course, if the use of risk assessment instruments allows law
329. See RoscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 66-67 (rev.
ed. 1954) (describing discretionary points in the justice system); Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Criminal Justice System Flowchart, USDOJ.Gov, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
largechart.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (visually depicting decisional nodes in the criminal
justice system).
330. See SHAWN BUSHWAY & Jeffrey Smith, Sentencing Using Statistical Treatment
Rules: What We Don't Know Can Hurt Us, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378-82
(2007) (noting that predictions relating risk to recidivism are complicated by the crime-
suppressing actions of police, probation officers, and others in the criminal justice system).
331. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and
Criminal Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 105 (2003)
(describing actuarial profiling); William F. Walsh, Compstat: An Analysis of an Emerging
Police Managerial Paradigm, 24 POLICING 347 (2001) (describing an analytic process to
prioritize allocation of law enforcement resources).
332. HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 154.
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enforcement agents to successfully catch and incapacitate more offenders,
society may be willing to tolerate the reification of a stereotype. But ac-
tuarial methods "may actually encourage, rather than deter, the overall
commission of the targeted crime. ' 333 If the criminal behavior of those
with high-risk traits is relatively inelastic, they will continue to offend
even in the face of heightened law enforcement surveillance and will fill
up the prisons; those without high-risk traits, however, observing that law
enforcement resources are directed at those with high-risk traits, may
choose to offend because police resources are directed elsewhere and the
relative probability of successfully committing the crime is high. Under
such circumstances, the net frequency of a given crime may actually
increase. 334
Actuarial sentencing faces other logistical challenges. Implementation
of an evidence-based system may prove incredibly difficult for jurisdic-
tions that have previously captured only limited data.335 If, for example,
no information were gathered about the criminal peers of previously-sen-
tenced defendants, it will not be possible to evaluate the efficacy of vari-
ous sentencing options in cases of defendants who had like numbers of
criminal peers (i.e., for defendants who had the same number of criminal
peers, did non-custodial punishments work better than brief or lengthy
periods of incarceration?). The evidence-based judge can still impose a
sentence based on extant criminological research,336 but direct compari-
sons of defendants is possible only when comparable data exists in past
cases. Shifting to an evidence-based system of sentencing from a guide-
lines regime or a system of mandatory minimum penalties would be diffi-
cult, as well. This could, for example, prove problematic in the federal
sentencing system:
[J]udges would not be able to draw directly from the last twenty
years of federal sentencing data because that data would reflect the
homogenizing influence of the mandatory Guidelines regime. Simi-
larly, mandatory minimum sentences would frustrate any effort to
identify optimal sentences that lay below the statutory floor. While
it might be possible to use pre-Guidelines data, twenty years of crime
legislation has changed the statutory landscape enormously, and the
availability of parole prior to 1984 would mask the actual sentences
333. Id. at 145.
334. See id. at 111-71.
335. See generally ROGER HOOD & RICHARD SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY
(1970).
[The accuracy and reliability of risk prediction tables] depends entirely on
the quality of information which is available about offenders; and at the mo-
ment this is very low, wherever research is based on administrative records
routinely kept by correctional agencies. Almost invariably, such personal
and social data as are available in these records are haphazardly recorded,
and are thus likely to be missing or inaccurate for a high proportion of cases;
information on some topics (for example, relations with peer groups) is in
our experience hardly ever recorded at all.
Id. at 185.




The logistical challenges associated with actuarial sentencing are seri-
ous. Even seemingly straightforward facts (like number of criminal
peers) may prove difficult for courts to reliably measure. But logistical
challenges will not be the only obstacles that courts face as they use risk
assessment tools to engage in evidence-based sentencing: they will also
face a variety of legal challenges. These are described in Part IV.B.
B. LEGAL CHALLENGES
Today, a sentencing judge can draw upon a wealth of criminological
studies to appreciate the variables associated with adult recidivism;338 can
choose from among a variety of commercially available risk assessment
instruments;339 and using a sentencing information system, can visually
observe which matched offenders have successfully avoided reoffend-
ing.340 In the hands of a thoughtful judge, these are powerful tools.
Judges employing these tools, however, will likely face a number of legal
challenges.
While some of the variables assessed by risk assessment instruments
are uncontroversial in traditional sentencing colloquies (e.g., adult crimi-
nal history),341 a number of other variables related to risk are constitu-
tionally suspect. Stripping people of fundamental rights or interests (such
as liberty) on the basis of a suspect classification (such as race or national
origin) is viewed with grave suspicion by the courts, and instead of defer-
ring to the legislature as long as there is a rational basis to the statute or
rule,342 such practices are scrutinized with strict scrutiny.343 Similarly,
deprivations imposed on the basis of gender are evaluated using interme-
diate review, which, although not as onerous as strict scrutiny, requires
substantially more justification than the rational basis test.344
Most U.S. jurisdictions explicitly prohibit judges from basing their sen-
337. Oleson, supra note 15, at 753.
338. See generally supra Part III.B.
339. See supra Part III.A. (describing commercial instruments).
340. See supra notes 93-99 (describing scatterplot-style graphic user interface) and ac-
companying text.
341. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998) (noting that the
"prior commission of a serious crime .. is as typical a sentencing factor as one might
imagine").
342. The rational basis test is permissive. As long as legislation serves a legitimate pub-
lic purpose, courts employing the rational basis test will ask only "whether the classifica-
tions drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
343. To survive strict scrutiny analysis, a policy must represent a compelling govern-
ment interest, must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest, and must use
the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (both tracing the
development of the strict scrutiny standard).
344. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (both applying intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications). Intermedi-
ate scrutiny has become a commonplace standard in contemporary jurisprudence, prompt-
ing one scholar to describe it as "the test that ate everything." Ashutosh Bhagwat, The
1372 [Vol. 64
Risk in Sentencing
tencing decisions on considerations of race or gender,345 although inter-
estingly, in Canada, judges are affirmatively directed to consider
defendants' aboriginal status when imposing criminal sentences. 346 Still,
even if U.S. judges do not consider race or gender explicitly, "[v]irtually
every sentencing system individualizes sentences based on predictions of
future dangerousness. '' 347 Given the relatively robust associations be-
tween risk, race, and gender, it may be difficult for judges to evaluate risk
without indirectly considering race and gender through criminal history
or other proxies. 348 That being the case, is it legally permissible for courts
to use risk assessment instruments in making sentencing decisions?
In 2010, in Malenchik v. Indiana,349 the Indiana Supreme Court consid-
ered the question of whether a trial court was permitted to consider risk
assessment scores from the LSI-R and the Substance Abuse Subtle
Screening Inventory (SASSI) when imposing a sentence.350 Anthony
Malenchik, who pled guilty to receiving stolen property and admitted to
being a habitual offender under Indiana law, challenged his sentence on
five bases, arguing that: (1) the trial court's use of numeric LSI-R and
SASSI scores was impermissible; (2) the scientific reliability of these in-
struments had not been demonstrated, and their use, therefore, contra-
vened state rules of evidence; (3) the risk assessment instruments,
measuring variables such as family disharmony, economic status, and so-
cial circumstances, were discriminatory; (4) the use of test results at the
sentencing hearing impinged upon the right to counsel; and (5) the use of
these risk assessment instruments did not comport with Indiana's penal
code (which is founded upon a principle of reformation, not vindictive
justice). 351 A unanimous Indiana Supreme Court, however, rejected each
of his claims.352
Two important facts supported Malenchik's first claim that the use of
the LSI-R score should not be permitted in sentencing. First, the LSI-R
manual itself is explicit in stating that the LSI-R was not designed to iden-
tify appropriate criminal sentences. 353 "This instrument is not a compre-
hensive survey of mitigating and aggravating factors relevant to criminal
Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REv. 783 (2007).
345. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 43, at 55.
346. Canada's Criminal Code § 718.2(e) calls for explicit consideration of ethnicity at
sentencing. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., § 718 (2011) ("[AIll available sanctions other
than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all
offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders") (emphasis
added). In R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
§ 718.2(e) applies to aboriginal peoples living off the reserve, as well as to those living on it
and in a traditional manner. The court reasoned that aboriginal persons have a long-stand-
ing disadvantage in Canadian society, and these effects are felt for generations.
347. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 43, at 71-72.
348. See Harcourt, supra note 214.
349. 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010).
350. Id. at 568.
351. Id. at 567-68.
352. Id. at 575.
353. Id. at 572.
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sanctioning and was never designed to assist in establishing the just pen-
alty. '354 Second, state precedent clearly indicated that sentencing with
the LSI-R was impermissible. 355 Specifically, the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals in Rhodes v. State had reasoned that the "use of a standardized
scoring model, such as the LSI-R, undercuts the trial court's responsibil-
ity to craft an appropriate, individualized sentence. ' 356 But the Indiana
Supreme Court in Malenchik disagreed with Rhodes. While the
Malenchik court was clear in holding that these risk assessment instru-
ments were neither intended nor recommended to supplant the judicial
role in ascertaining the appropriate length of sentence,357 the court was
also unequivocal in stating that a trial court's consideration of risk assess-
ment instruments was permissible (if not desirable):
[T]here is a growing body of impressive research supporting the
widespread use and efficacy of evidence-based offender assessment
tools. The results of such testing can enhance a trial judge's individu-
alized evaluation of the sentencing evidence and selection of the pro-
gram of penal consequences most appropriate for the reformation of
a particular offender .... We defer to the sound discernment and
discretion of trial judges to give the tools proper consideration and
appropriate weight. We disapprove of the resistance to LSI-R test
results expressed by the Court of Appeals in Rhodes.358
The court invoked these same themes to reject Malenchik's second
claim. While the court might have simply stated that the Indiana Rules of
Evidence do not apply in trial court sentencing proceedings,359 the court
instead elected to emphasize the depth and scope of published evaluation
research on the LSI-R.360 It wrote, "Given the extensive supporting re-
search and on-going evaluation... ,we believe that assessment tools such
as the LSI-R and the SASSI are sufficiently reliable to warrant considera-
tion . . . [by trial courts] for purposes of sentencing."' 361 Sentencing
judges in Indiana, as elsewhere, enjoy broad discretion as to the facts they
may consider at sentencing,362 and the Indiana Supreme Court certainly
was not required to justify the reliability of the LSI-R and the SASSI.
That it chose to do so may indicate something about the judiciary's esti-
mation of actuarial methods.
The Indiana Supreme Court also rejected Malenchik's third claim-
that use of these risk assessment instruments, measuring variables such as
354. Id. (quoting LSI-R Manual at 3).
355. Rhodes v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
356. Id.
357. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 573.
358. Id.
359. See id. ("The Indiana Rules of Evidence, except with respect to privileges, do not
apply in trial court sentencing proceedings.") (citations omitted).
360. See id. at 574-75 (summarizing evaluation research).
361. Id. at 574.
362. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (noting that sentencing
judges "may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to
the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come").
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family disharmony, economic status, and social circumstances, was dis-
criminatory.363 The court noted that information of this kind is "required
by statute to be presented . . . in every presentence investigation re-
port."' 364 Here, too, the court could have left the matter at that, but-
once again-it emphasized the empirical foundations of the risk instru-
ments, enthusiastically writing, "[S]upporting research convincingly
shows that offender risk assessment instruments, which are substantially
based on such personal and sociological data, are effective in predicting
the risk of recidivism and the amenability to rehabilitative treatment. '365
The Indiana Supreme Court also rejected Malenchik's fourth claim that
because defense counsel do not have access to risk assessment scoring
sheets prior to sentencing hearings, the use of the assessment impinged
upon the right to counsel.366 The court noted that defense counsel are
provided with a copy of the pre-sentence investigation report, and that
this documentation adequately provides defense counsel with the requi-
site information to challenge sentencing provisions based on the risk as-
sessment or to use the assessment scores to argue for a suspended
sentence or other favorable sentencing conditions. 367 Once again, the
court went out of its way to justify its reasoning by emphasizing the relia-
bility of the LSI-R and the SASSI. The court concluded, "[W]e find that
the LSI-R and SASSI assessment tools and other similar instruments em-
ployed by probation departments have been sufficiently scrutinized to
satisfy the reliability requirement for consideration by trial courts in sen-
tencing proceedings." 368
Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected Malenchik's claim that use
of risk assessment instruments is inconsistent with Article 1, Section 18 of
the Indiana Constitution, which establishes a penal system founded upon
the principle of reformation. 369 The court wrote, "We find the opposite.
Such instruments endeavor to provide usable information based on ex-
tensive penal and sociological research to assist the trial judge in crafting
individualized sentencing schemes with a maximum potential for
reformation."370
363. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 574-75.
364. Id. at 574.
365. Id.




370. Id. Kelly Hannah-Moffat notes that many commentators see evidence-based sen-
tencing as a means to effectively rehabilitate:
[Tihe use of risk instruments to seemingly customize sentences through the
provision of targeted interventions and clear strategies of risk management is
persuasive. Some evidence suggests that judges were more likely to release
to the community when the risk assessment included information on risk
management than when it only provided a prediction of risk level. Risk-need
assessment is being popularized as a reasonable way of restricting custodial
populations, reinvigorating rehabilitation, and enhancing public safety
through "anticipated" reductions of "recidivism."
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It is difficult to read Malenchik v. Indiana as anything but an endorse-
ment of actuarial sentencing. In arriving at its holding, the Indiana Su-
preme Court relied upon the amicus brief of the Indiana Judicial
Center,371 which in turn drew from a body of scholarship related to LSI-
R evaluation and evidence-based practices. While the court did not sug-
gest that the LSI-R should determine the length of a defendant's sen-
tence, it saw no impediment to providing risk assessment scores to judges
for use in determining how sentences should be served.
372
Perhaps the Malenchik court would have found in favor of the defen-
dant if the trial judge had used only the risk scores (and not also the
contents of the pre-sentence investigation report) in crafting the sen-
tence. Perhaps the Malenchik court would have found in favor of the
defendant if the trial judge had determined the length of sentence (and
not just the conditions of sentencing) by using the LSI-R and the SASSI.
Perhaps. Future litigation will undoubtedly address some of these ques-
tions. But the Malenchik opinion is an instructive example of the con-
temporary judiciary's desire for tools that promise greater efficacy in
sentencing. While defendants' legal rights are essential considerations for
jurists, so too is evidence of validity and reliability in risk assessment
instruments.
In Part IV.C, below, I will consider four of the constitutional challenges
that may be leveled at evidence-based sentencing practices. Most courts
would not uphold defendants' challenges to evidence-based sentencing
based on free speech, double jeopardy, or trial by jury rights, but some
courts would be sympathetic to equal protection claims. Although courts
frequently dismiss constitutional challenges in the sentencing context, a
number of courts have struck down sentences that were based upon sus-
pect considerations such as race, gender, or age.373
However, in Part IV.D, infra, I argue that if used in concert with other,
unprotected variables, even suspect classifications such as race and gen-
der could survive intermediate-or even strict-scrutiny analysis. Al-
though it is sometimes said that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and
Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An "Unsettled" Proposition, CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2011) (citations omitted), available at http://www.albany.edu/scj/
documents/Hannah-MoffattRiskAssesment.pdf. While James Bonta is critical of much of
Hannah-Moffat's previous work on the subject, he agrees that risk assessment may actually
fuel decarceration. See James Bonta, Offender Risk Assessment and Sentencing, 49 CAN. J.
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 519, 524 (2007) (noting that "bringing risk assessment to
bear on sentencing may actually lead to less use of incarceration rather than ... to more.
Over-classification appears more likely in the absence of objective risk information") (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis in original).
371. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 569 ("The amicus brief of the Indiana Judicial Center
informs the Court of the growing acceptance and use of evidence-based practices in seek-
ing to reduce offender recidivism and to improve sentencing outcomes.").
372. Id. at 573 (noting that risk assessment instruments are neither intended nor recom-
mended to supplant the judicial function of determining the length of an appropriate
sentence).
373. See, e.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating sentence and assigning sentencing to
new judge for consideration of race or gender).
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fatal in fact, ' 374 empirical research suggests that the lethality of strict
scrutiny analysis is overstated.375
In Korematsu v. United States,376 the Supreme Court upheld even the
government's program of detaining 110,000 Japanese-Americans in in-
ternment camps.377 In his dissent, Justice Murphy condemned the intern-
ment program for "fall[ing] into the ugly abyss of racism. '378 Similarly,
Justice Jackson warned that "once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an
order to show that it conforms to the Constitution,... the Court for all
time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal proce-
dure. '379 But in Korematsu, six of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court
were willing to detain American citizens in "relocation centers"-Justice
Black resisted calling them "concentration camps"-and to strip civil
rights from a group of citizens because of their race. While it is a contro-
versial and widely disliked opinion,380 Korematsu has never been over-
turned and remains good law.
Given the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause,381 it is inconceiv-
able that a court would uphold a sentence imposed purely on the basis of
race or gender (e.g., "Because you are a black male, you are sentenced to
the maximum penalty permitted by law"), but it is possible to imagine
courts upholding the use of risk assessment instruments that assess sus-
pect classifications as well as other, traditional sentencing factors (e.g.,
"Because your risk assessment scores indicate that you have multiple
criminogenic risk factors, all contributing to a great risk of recidivism, you
are sentenced to the maximum penalty permitted by law"). In this way,
included explicitly or indirectly as part of risk assessments, suspect classi-
fications might operate as "plus factors," allowing judges to assess risk
with greater precision to advance the compelling state interest of public
safety. Such an approach may survive constitutional scrutiny. After all,
in Grutter v. Bollinger,382 the Supreme Court upheld the affirmative ac-
tion plan at the University of Michigan's law school after concluding that
race was a plus factor that advanced the compelling state interest in a
diverse student body.383
374. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
375. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (reporting that
thirty percent of the laws reviewed under strict scrutiny, survived the review).
376. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
377. Id. at 222-24. See generally MAISIE CONRAT & RICHARD CONRAT, EXECUTIVE
ORDER 9066: THE INTERNMENT OF 110,000 JAPANESE AMERICANS (1972).
378. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
379. Id. at 246.
380. Bernard Schwartz has named it as number six among the ten worst decisions of the
Supreme Court. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS: THE BEST AND WORST
IN AMERICAN LAW WITH 100 COURT AND JUDGE TRIVIA QUESTIONS 69 (1997).
381. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
382. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).




It is not obvious to what extent constitutional rights apply to sentencing
proceedings. In Williams v. New York,384 the Supreme Court held that
trial judges had nearly unlimited judicial discretion about the facts that
may be considered at sentencing and about the weight they should be
afforded.38 5 Distinguishing sentencing from adjudication of guilt, Justice
Black wrote on behalf of the Court:
Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which nar-
rowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to
the particular offense charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity
to prevent a time consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues.
They were also designed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with
the issue of guilt of a particular offense from being influenced to
convict for that offense by evidence that the defendant had habitu-
ally engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing judge, however, is
not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statu-
tory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of
punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly rel-
evant-if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is
the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the de-
fendant's life and characteristics. 38 6
This type of wide-ranging inquiry, looking far beyond the elements of
the charged offense, is essential to the kind of real offense sentencing
operating in the federal courts.38 7 Of course, Williams has been super-
seded by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e), 388 but the Supreme
Court still cites its principles favorably, 38 9 and some lower courts con-
tinue to rely upon it as if it were still good law. 390 Even courts that do not
necessarily cleave to Williams regularly reject constitutional challenges to
sentencing proceedings by (uncritically) citing previous practice, 391
stressing the need for comprehensive information about the offender, 392
384. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
385. Id. at 250-52.
386. Id. at 246-47.
387. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1218 (3d ed. 2000). For a
discussion of real offense sentencing, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495 (1990)
(describing relevant conduct sentencing); David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' Misguided Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267 (2005)
(criticizing real offense sentencing).
388. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 43, at 85.
389. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 387, at 1216.
390. See, e.g., United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United
States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1246-47 (D. Utah 2004); State v. Carico, 968
S.W.2d 280, 287 (Tenn. 1998) (all citing Williams).
391. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 340 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (as-
serting that "determinations of acceptance of responsibility, repentance, character, and fu-
ture dangerousness ... [are] probably the bulk of what most sentencing is all about").
392. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (citing "the longstanding prin-
ciple that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of informa-
tion"); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (noting that sentencing judges
"may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the
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or noting the impracticality of testing every fact at issue in sentencing.393
Indeed, the legal system recognizes, explicitly, the inability to incorporate
a full complement of evidentiary rules during sentencing proceedings. 394
Still, some constitutional rights are recognized at sentencing.395 There
is, for example, a procedural right to notice, 396 a right to effective coun-
sel,3 97 and a right against self-incrimination. 398 There are some substan-
tive rights as well. Courts have struck down sentences based upon
materially false facts,399 and have invalidated higher sentences that were
imposed upon defendants for successfully having appealed their original
sentences. 400 Courts also have struck down sentences that were based
upon impermissible classifications such as race,401 national origin, 402 and
gender.403 In McKleskey v. Kemp,404 the Supreme Court made it clear
that capital juries were free to "consider any factor relevant to the defen-
dant's background, character, and the offense," 40 5 but that "purposeful
discrimination" in sentencing, based upon the race of either the victim or
defendant, would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.406
While it is often said that "death is different, ' 40 7 and while "[s]ome pro-
cedures that are constitutionally required for capital cases would not be
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come"); Williams v.
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959) ("In discharging his duty of imposing a proper sen-
tence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances involved in the crime."); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949) ("Highly relevant-if not essential-to [the judge's] selection of an appro-
priate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defen-
dant's life and characteristics.").
393. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 250 ("[T]he modern probation report draws on informa-
tion concerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The type and extent of this information
make totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with cross-examination.").
394. See FED. R. EvID. 1101(d); see also Malenchik v. Indiana, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573
(Ind. 2010) (describing same inapplicability in state sentencings).
395. See Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1773-74
(2003) (suggesting that since Williams v. New York was decided, more rights at sentencing
have been recognized "than many have supposed").
396. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991).
397. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 136-37 (1967).
398. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 316 (1999).
399. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
400. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969).
401. See United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) ("A defendant's race or
nationality may play no adverse role in the administration of justice, including at sentenc-
ing."); United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) ("even the appearance that
the sentence reflects a defendant's race or nationality will ordinarily require a remand for
resentencing").
402. See, e.g., United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 1989) (vacat-
ing sentence based in part upon the defendant's national origin); United States v. Gomez,
797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that it would be unconstitutional to punish a
defendant more severely based on nationality).
403. See, e.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974).
404. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
405. Id. at 295 n.14 (emphasis in original).
406. Id. at 292.
407. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (both invoking phrase).
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required in noncapital cases, ' 408 the prohibition against sentencing on the
basis of race has been enforced by non-capital courts as well.40 9
Still, as a general matter (except for these few procedural protections
and these few suspect classifications), courts have been loath to uphold
constitutional challenges in sentencing. In an insightful article in the Cal-
ifornia Law Review,410 Carissa Byrne Hessick and F. Andrew Hessick
recently observed, "Instead of engaging in ordinary constitutional analy-
sis when defendants challenge [sentencing] factors, courts have swept
constitutional concerns under the proverbial rug based on the un-
grounded conclusion that the sentencing process is somehow different
and thus shielded from constitutional review."' 41' Constitutional chal-
lenges are upheld only when sentences are based upon clearly impermis-
sible classifications or when clearly established procedural rights are
breached.
Yes, if a judge imposed a lengthy sentence on an African-American
defendant, stating that the specific sentence had been selected on the ba-
sis of the defendant's race, the sentence would be remanded for resen-
tencing because of the risk (or at least the appearance) of invidious
discrimination.412 Indeed, an entirely new judge might be assigned for
resentencing.41 3 But absent a sentence starkly imposed on the basis of a
constitutionally impermissible factor (e.g., race, national origin, or gen-
der),414 or in violation of an established procedural requirement, 4 5 a de-
fendant's constitutional challenge to his or her sentence is unlikely to
succeed.
What about evidence-based sentences that rely upon assessments of
risk? In Malenchik v. Indiana,416 described above,417 the Indiana Su-
preme Court upheld the trial court's use of LSI-R and SASSI scores.418
Indeed, the court went further, stating that sentencing judges should use
this information in their sentencing deliberations. 419 But what if the risk
408. LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT LAW 19 (2004).
409. See, e.g., Jackson v. Maryland, 772 A.2d 273, 279 (Md. 2001) ("The constitutional
guarantee of due process of law forbids a court from imposing a sentence based in any part
on inappropriate considerations, including improper considerations relating to race.").
410. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 43.
411. Id. at 57.
412. See, e.g., United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994).
413. See id. at 587.
414. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 387, at 1219 ("[T]he race of the victim or defen-
dant (and, presumably, the gender of the victim or defendant) cannot be the basis for
setting a sentence .... ).
415. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 43, at 53-54 (describing procedural rights en-
forced by courts even at sentencing).
416. 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010).
417. See supra notes 349-73 and accompanying text.
418. See Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 575.
419. Id. at 574 ("Having been determined to be statistically valid, reliable, and effective
in forecasting recidivism, the assessment tool scores may, and if possible should, be consid-
ered to supplement and enhance a judge's evaluation, weighing, and application of the
other sentencing evidence in the formulation of an individualized sentencing program ap-
propriate for each defendant.") (emphasis added).
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instruments in Malenchik had included race and gender as explicit assess-
ment criteria? After all, many risk instruments do use gender as a crite-
rion,420 and race has been identified as a significant correlate of
recidivism by Don Gottfredson,421 Paul Gendreau,422 and the Virginia
Criminal Sentencing Commission.423 What if a court constructed a sen-
tencing information system that displayed risk as a scatterplot?424 What
if, at sentencing, that court used the sentencing information system to
match defendants with other, like offenders in its database, using the sev-
enteen variables identified as most predictive of adult recidivism in Gen-
dreau's meta-analysis? 425
Normally, the imposition of differential punishments based on racial
classifications would suggest a prima facie violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause,426 and would fail under strict scrutiny analysis. 427 Strict scru-
tiny is intended to be a difficult hurdle for the government to clear. 428
The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only be-
cause those classifications can harm favored races or are based on
illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government
places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the pro-
vision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. Purchased at the
price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection princi-
ple reflects our Nation's understanding that such classifications ulti-
mately have a destructive impact on the individual and our
society.429
In like manner, imposing disparate penalties based solely on gender
normally would fail under intermediate review.430 But relating race and
gender to risk would increase the likelihood that their use would survive
a constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds. Considering race
and gender, but in combination with other risk factors, would be even
more likely to survive. The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger,431 a case involving race-based affirmative action in higher edu-
420. See, e.g., BARNOSKI & DRAKE, supra note 131, at 6; OSTROM ET AL., supra note 98,
at 27 (identifying, respectively, Washington and Virginia risk instruments that include gen-
der as a measured characteristic).
421. See Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 5.
422. See Gendreau et al., supra note 39.
423. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 98, at 27-28.
424. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
425. See Gendreau et al., supra note 39, at 582-83 (identifying seventeen variables sta-
tistically associated with adult recidivism: (1) criminal companions, (2) criminogenic needs,
(3) antisocial personality, (4) adult criminal history, (5) race, (6) pre-adult antisocial behav-
ior, (7) family rearing practices, (8) social achievement, (9) interpersonal conflict, (10) cur-
rent age, (11) substance abuse, (12) family structure, (13) intellectual functioning, (14)
family criminality, (15) gender, (16) socio-economic status of origin, and (17) personal
distress).
426. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
427. See supra note 343 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny analysis).
428. See e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 866 (4th Cir. 1998).
429. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
430. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (describing intermediate review).
431. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
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cation,432 may indicate how the use of race and gender might also be
viewed within the context of evidence-based sentencing.
D. GRUTFER V, BOLLINGER: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION?
Grutter, of course, had nothing to do with sentencing. Rather, the
question in Grutter was "whether the use of race as a factor in student
admissions by the University of Michigan Law School ... [was] unlaw-
ful. '433 After Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8
grade point average (GPA) and a 161 Law School Admissions Test
(LSAT) score, was rejected by the University of Michigan's elite law
school, she sued, alleging that the law school had discriminated against
her on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.434
The district court held that the law school's consideration of race as a
factor in admissions decisions was unconstitutional, 435 reasoning that the
law school's stated objective of creating a racially diverse class was not a
compelling government interest.436 Even if it was, the law school's ad-
missions policy was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to advance that in-
terest.437 Sitting en banc, the court of appeals reversed, finding that
racial diversity was a compelling interest, and that Michigan Law's policy
was narrowly tailored because it was "virtually identical" to the Harvard
admissions program 438 appended to Justice Powell's controlling opinion
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.439 In a five-to-four
decision, 440 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the law school's
use of race in admission decisions.441
The dissenting Justices in Grutter claimed that the majority
pantomimed strict scrutiny analysis but did not actually apply the stan-
dard.442 Justice O'Connor, however, writing for the majority, rejected
432. Id. at 306.
433. Id. at 311.
434. Id. at 316-17.
435. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2001) rev'd en banc, 288
F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
436. Id. at 853.
437. Id. at 850.
438. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739, 749 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
439. 438 U.S. 265, 321-24 (1978). The Bakke case produced six opinions, none of which
commanded a majority of the Court. Four justices would have upheld a medical school
admissions policy reserving 16 of 100 seats for minorities; four justices struck down the
policy on statutory grounds. Justice Powell's fifth vote struck down the quota, but also
reversed the state court's injunction against any consideration of race.
440. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion
of the Court and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice
Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
each filed dissenting opinions).
441. Id. at 343.
442. See id. at 380 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the language
of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its defer-
ence."); id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court, however, does not apply strict
scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling
precedents."); id. at 378 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "the majority has placed its
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this characterization. 443 She identified the strict scrutiny standard: "[AIll
racial classifications imposed by government ... are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored to further compelling government inter-
ests." 4" She agreed with the dissenters that strict scrutiny is a serious
matter,445 quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia: "[W]henever the
government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and
spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection." 446 But Justice
O'Connor noted that race-based government action does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection when it serves a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored.447
The Court determined that Michigan Law had a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.44 8 A diverse law school class fosters
cross-racial understanding, deconstructs stereotypes, and better prepares
its students to work as professionals in an increasingly diverse society.449
Although Justice O'Connor acknowledged that some of the Court's
precedents imply that remedying past discrimination is the only permissi-
ble justification for governmental racial classification, 450 she rejected that
inference, writing that "we have never held that the only governmental
use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past
discrimination." 451
Having determined that Michigan Law enjoyed a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body, the Court asked whether the law
school's admissions scheme was narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
Justice O'Connor noted that while a rigid quota system would be imper-
missible,452 universities may consider race or ethnicity as a plus factor as
part of an admissions policy premised upon individualized considera-
tion.453 Such a policy comports with Justice Powell's controlling opinion
in Bakke.454 Because Michigan Law considered race among a constella-
imprimatur on a practice that can only weaken the principle of equality embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause").
443. Id. at 334 (stating that "[c]ontrary to Justice Kennedy's assertions, we do not
'abandon strict scrutiny"').
444. Id. at 326.
445. Id. at 326-27; see also supra note 429 and accompanying text (characterizing racial
classifications as inherently destructive).
446. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S.
200, 229-30 (1995)).
447. Id. at 327.
448. Id. at 328.
449. Id. at 330.
450. See id. at 328 (noting that "unless classifications based on race are 'strictly reserved
for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility"') (quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989))).
451. Id.
452. See id. at 334. Characterizing the University of Michigan's point-based affirmative
action policy for undergraduates as a quota led the Court to invalidate the policy in the
companion case to Grutter, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 335; see also supra note 439 and accompanying text (describing Bakke).
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tion of other (non-racial) diversity factors, it employed race in a "flexible,
nonmechanical way."'455 In the Court's estimation, this meant that the
"admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. ' 456
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that less restrictive, race-
neutral, means could also achieve racial diversity. "Narrow tailoring does
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor
does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportu-
nities to members of all racial groups." 457 Alternatives such as a lottery
or decreasing the emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores would force admin-
istrators to sacrifice diversity, academic excellence, or both.458
The Court did hold that "race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time.... Enshrining a permanent justification for racial prefer-
ences would offend [the] fundamental equal protection principle. '459
Noting that twenty-five years had passed since Bakke, and that the num-
ber of qualified minority applicants had increased, the Court suggested
that after twenty-five more years, racial preferences will no longer be re-
quired to achieve a diverse student body. 460 Summarizing the Court's
holding in Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote, "[T]he Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race
in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."461
The Court's reasoning in Grutter should prove instructive for judges
interested in the constitutionality of evidence-based sentencing. While
contemporary risk assessment instruments do not explicitly measure race,
race has been identified as a highly predictive correlate of recidivism,462
and other, measured variables may operate as proxies for race.463 It is
also possible that a court would be interested in using race as an explicit
variable within a sentencing information system to match defendants
against like, previous offenders in an attempt to identify optimal sentence
length and conditions.464 If challenged, as in Malenchik v. Indiana,465 evi-
dence-based sentencing courts may wish to negotiate strict scrutiny analy-
sis by adopting the logic of Grutter.
455. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 339.
458. Id. at 340.
459. Id. at 342.
460. See id. at 343.
461. Id.
462. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 98, at 27-28; Gendreau et al., supra note 39; Gottf-
redson, supra note 10, at 9 (all reporting significant association between race and
recidivism).
463. Harcourt, supra note 214.
464. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing a graphic interface for sen-
tencing information system).
465. 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010). For a discussion of Malenchik, see supra notes
312-328 and accompanying text.
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Even evidence-based sentencing that uses race as an explicit factor to
impose punishment may survive strict scrutiny. To survive constitutional
challenge, evidence-based sentencing must satisfy the three prongs of the
strict scrutiny test: (1) a compelling governmental interest, (2) narrowly
tailored action, and (3) the unavailability of less restrictive means to sat-
isfy the government's interest.
The first prong asks whether protecting the public from crime is a com-
pelling state interest. In some ways, preventing crime seems like the do-
mestic equivalent of national security, which was upheld as a compelling
governmental interest in Korematsu v. United States. 466 But other objec-
tives-even objectives that are lauded by the courts under other circum-
stances-have been deemed insufficient.467' Justice Thomas suggested
that the threshold to establish a compelling governmental interest is very
high: "Where the Court has accepted only national security, and rejected
even the best interests of a child, as a justification for racial discrimina-
tion, I conclude that only those measures the State must take to provide a
bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a 'press-
ing public necessity.' ,,4 68
Justice Thomas implied that most governmental interests-even per-
fectly legitimate governmental interests-will fail the first prong of the
strict scrutiny test. But evidence-based sentencing is in luck: the preven-
tion of crime has already been identified as a compelling governmental
interest by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 1984 case Schall v. Martin,469
Justice Rehnquist asserted the fact in bold terms, writing that "[t]he 'le-
gitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting the community from
crime cannot be doubted. '470
The second prong asks whether evidence-based sentencing's use of ra-
cial classifications is narrowly tailored. Here, Grutter may prove instruc-
tive. If a sentencing court were to draw upon research associating race
and crime,471 and then impose a blunt distribution of punishment in
which African-Americans always received the maximum penalty permit-
ted by law, Asians always received the minimum penalty, and whites al-
ways received the midpoint penalty, this would presumably flunk strict
466. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding the in-
ternment of Japanese-Americans).
467. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (rejecting
the remedying of general societal discrimination as grounds for racial classification); Pal-
more v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding the best interests of a child whose mother
was in a mixed-race marriage to be "substantial" but not compelling enough to award
custody to the father).
468. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
469. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
470. Id. at 264; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); De Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144, 155 (1960).
471. See Wright, supra note 220, at 146 ("INTERPOL statistics on homicide, rape, and
serious assault consistently show that Orientals have the lowest involvement in serious
crime, followed by Caucasians, and then blacks.").
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scrutiny. Quotas are not narrowly tailored.472 But using race in a flexible
and non-mechanical manner may satisfy the narrow tailoring prong.473 If
race were employed as a "plus factor" and included among other relevant
variables in a statistical model, it would help the sentencing judge to bet-
ter ascertain the most effective sentence for each individual defendant.
Racial differences, after all, are statistically correlated with recidivism
risk,474 and in the words of the Grutter Court, "the very purpose of strict
scrutiny is to take . . . 'relevant differences into account.' ' 475
The third prong, demonstrating that no less restrictive means will sat-
isfy the compelling governmental interest, is relatively straightforward.
Research has shown that excluding race from mathematical models of
recidivism degrades the predictive power of the model significantly. Joan
Petersilia and Susan Turner found that omitting race-correlated factors
from a model to predict recidivism reduced the accuracy of the model by
five to twelve percentage points.476 Race and its correlates can be ex-
cluded from evidence-based sentencing, but only at the cost of compro-
mising the ability of the government to achieve its compelling interest
(preventing crime). In terms of attaching temporal limits to the use of
race in evidence-based sentencing, courts could choose to include racial
variables in their models for as long as those variables remain significant
predictors of recidivism, relinquishing their use if and when they cease to
be significantly predictive. This approach is consistent with the race-neu-
tral ideals articulated by the Court.477
In summation, evidence-based sentencing, like the affirmative action
program upheld by the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, would probably sur-
vive strict scrutiny analysis. But evidence-based sentencing is different
from affirmative action in at least one essential respect. In Grutter, the
Court was permitting the use of race to offset the negative effects of past
discrimination.478 That is not the objective of evidence-based sentencing.
Instead of trying to redress this country's stark racial disparities in the
criminal justice system,479 actuarial sentencing builds upon a statistical
472. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program cannot use a quota system-it cannot 'insulate each category of applicants with
certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants.').
473. See id. (upholding policy of individualized consideration).
474. See supra note 412 and accompanying text (indicating that race is correlated with
recidivism rates).
475. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,
228 (1995)).
476. See Petersilia & Turner, supra note 42, at 173.
477. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43 (noting that because racial classifications are so
potentially dangerous to society, they should not be extended any longer than necessary).
478. Id.; cf. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(noting that if racial classifications are not used for remedial purposes, they may exacer-
bate racial tensions).
479. Racial disparity is endemic in the U.S. criminal justice system. See supra note 220
and accompanying text. Because it is such a serious issue, there is a massive literature-
some of which is quite empirical, some quite abstract-on the subject. See, e.g., DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS (1990); COLE, supra note 220; RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE
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association between variables (such as race) and crime to predict recidi-
vism. These predictions may justify-at least in part-the imposition of
disparate criminal sentences based on a number of variables correlated
with risk, including race. Thus, evidence-based sentencing has the poten-
tial to reify, rather than ameliorate, extant racial disparities.480
Ironically, if a state determined that it was a laudable goal to artificially
reduce the number of minorities in its prisons-using actuarial sentencing
to ensure that the proportion of incarcerated blacks corresponded to the
proportion of blacks in the overall population-this probably would vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. 481
Of course, courts applying strict scrutiny analysis will not ask whether
the ends of actuarial sentencing are laudable and desirable goals. It does
not matter. "[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause
is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particu-
lar classification. '482 Courts subjecting evidence-based sentencing to
strict scrutiny analysis will ask only whether the prevention of crime is a
compelling government interest (it is).483 They will ask whether the racial
classification is narrowly tailored (it will probably be deemed so).484 And
they will ask whether a less restrictive means will achieve the compelling
government interest (research suggests that it will not).4 85
Once the constitutional door is open to race, all other sentencing fac-
tors can pass through: gender, age, marital status, education, class, and so
forth. If a sentencing information system that includes race as an explicit
variable can survive strict scrutiny, then a system that includes gender as
an explicit variable would survive intermediate review (as this is a less
onerous standard).486 And where race and gender are permitted as sen-
tencing factors, other personal characteristics, ceteris paribus, will be per-
mitted as well.
Certainly, if a sentencing information system that explicitly includes
race as a variable can pass constitutional muster, then the use of risk as-
sessment instruments that do not measure race, per se, but measure cor-
LAW (1997); GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES (2008);
SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 2000); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
(2007); Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Crim-
inal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 (2003) (all describing racial dispar-
ity in the justice system).
480. See HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 190 ("The use of actuarial methods tends to
accentuate the prejudices and biases that are built into the penal code and into criminal
law enforcement.").
481. This would operate as a mechanical quota, and be more akin to the unconstitu-
tional undergraduate admissions policy of Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), than the
permissible law school policy evaluated in Grutter.
482. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion).
483. See supra note 470 and accompanying text.
484. See supra note 473 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 476 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (describing intermediate review).
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related variables (e.g., criminal history),487 would be permissible. The
likely constitutionality of evidence-based sentencing may come as a relief
to sentencing judges who believe-probably correctly488-that they can
impose better sentences by employing actuarial techniques, and to judges
who are frustrated by sentencing guidelines that must be calculated 48 9 but
cannot be followed. 490 For these judges, evidence-based sentencing may
serve as a bona fide paradigm shift-a new way forward.491 But the con-
stitutionality of evidence-based sentencing does not solve the serious-
and perhaps intractable-philosophical problems that lurk within the
approach.
E. PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES
Given that risk assessment has been used within the criminal justice
system for at least eighty years, 492 commentators have commented upon
many of the philosophical conundrums associated with evidence-based
sentencing.493 A full catalog lies beyond the scope of this article, but four
particularly thorny issues bear mentioning: (1) the very nature of the as-
sessed variables may make evidence-based sentencing unfair; (2) the pro-
spective orientation of evidence-based sentencing troubles some
commentators; (3) risk-correlated variables that warrant increased pun-
ishments on utilitarian grounds may suggest reduced punishments when
considered from a retributivist perspective; and (4) those who advocate
for evidence-based sentencing because it may reduce the penalties for a
given population may or may not understand that other populations will
be penalized. Each of these issues will be outlined below.
The seventeen variables associated with adult recidivism in Gendreau's
meta-analysis494 may prove to be philosophically problematic when em-
ployed in evidence-based sentencing. Some of those seventeen variables
(e.g., antisocial personality, criminal companions, substance abuse, and
even employment) are bourgeois and paternalistic in nature. For exam-
ple, while there may be a statistical relationship between the number of
487. See Harcourt, supra note 214 (noting that criminal history may operate as a proxy
for race).
488. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
489. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (requiring sentencing court
to calculate guidelines).
490. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009) (holding that without further
analysis, district courts may not consider a guidelines sentence to be presumptively
reasonable).
491. See Oleson, supra note 15, at 738 (analogizing the increasingly-elaborate federal
sentencing guidelines to Ptolemaic models of the solar system and suggesting that a para-
digm shift to a data-driven Copernican model is needed).
492. See Burgess, supra note 114 (publishing pioneering risk assessment tool in 1928);
see also HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 47-107 (tracing rise of risk-based actuarialism).
493. See, e.g., Feeley & Simon, supra note 52; Netter, supra note 157; Pat O'Malley, The
Uncertain Promise of Risk, 37 AusTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 323 (2004); Rasmus H.
Wandall, Actuarial Risk Assessment: The Loss of Recognition of the Individual Offender, 5
L. PROBABILITY & RISK 175 (2006) (all critiquing aspects of actuarial justice).
494. Gendreau et al., supra note 39 (identifying seventeen variables statistically associ-
ated with adult recidivism).
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criminal peers with whom a defendant associates and recidivism risk,495 it
is nevertheless troubling to consider affirmatively punishing a defendant
for merely associating with "the wrong sort of person." What of our
rights of assembly? 496 Similarly, while unemployment may indeed be as-
sociated with recidivism,497 the notion that we will criminally punish
someone (or increase someone's punishment) 498 for not holding down a
job is repugnant. In a like manner, it is not difficult to believe that sub-
stance abuse is associated with recidivism,499 but the idea of enhancing a
defendant's punishment simply because he is addicted to alcohol and/or
drugs veers perilously close to the government action outlawed by the
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California.500
Even more troublesome is the prospect of punishing a defendant for an
ascribed characteristic. A judge might reasonably be willing to increase a
defendant's punishment because of something that he did or did not do
(e.g., get arrested, go to college, get married, and so forth), but judges
may rightly balk at increasing a punishment because of who someone is.
Unfortunately, research suggests that for better or worse, in the real
world, ascribed characteristics do play a role in the discretionary deci-
sions made by actors in the criminal justice system, 501 although this may
offend our moral intuitions. "Many people believe it unjust to base pun-
ishment decisions on factors over which the offender has no control. ' 50 2
People do not choose to be born male or female, or to criminal or non-
criminal parents, or with high IQ scores or learning disabilities. These
traits may be correlated with recidivism risk, but to impose disparate pun-
ishments based upon ascribed characteristics seems palpably unfair.
Upon reflection, however, it becomes clear that this is but one example of
a much larger philosophical problem that permeates the criminal justice
495. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
496. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
497. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
498. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the
Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 726 (1994) (noting that courts
have "devised a convenient yet dangerous fiction in the form of the 'punishment-enhance-
ment' distinction. According to this theory, a sentence enhancement does not constitute
punishment").
499. See supra notes 271, 274 and accompanying text.
500. 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (noting that drug addiction is an illness, not a crime,
and holding that ninety days in jail for being ill violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-33
(1968) (distinguishing punishable behavior [public intoxication] from non-punishable dis-
ease [alcoholism]).
501. See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti & John R. Hepburn, Prosecutorial Discretion to
Defer Criminalization: The Effects of Defendant's Ascribed and Achieved Status Character-
istics, 12 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 63 (1996).
502. Tonry, supra note 164, at 397; see also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and
Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 300-03 (2006).
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system: moral luck.50 3 Every day, myriad externalities over which people
exercise no control determine whether (and how much) they will be pun-
ished. The distracted driver who strikes and kills a pedestrian in a cross-
walk will be charged with vehicular manslaughter; but without a
pedestrian in the crosswalk, that same driver, engaging in the same con-
duct, will have committed no offense. Similarly, the pugilist who beats his
victim into unconsciousness in a hospital parking lot will be convicted
only of assault (his victim lives); but the pugilist who inflicts identical in-
juries on his victim, but does so in remote Alaska, will be convicted of
second-degree murder, because his victim dies en route to the hospital.
The ascribed characteristics used in evidence-based sentencing may be
philosophically problematic, but the philosophical problem they re-
present is much more sweeping than evidence-based sentencing: moral
luck shapes all phases of the criminal justice system. 50 4
A second philosophical challenge to evidence-based sentencing relates
to punishing defendants not for what they have done, but for what other
(statistically similar) offenders have done. Reminiscent of the concept of
"pre-crime" punished in Minority Report,505 the forecasting of future
criminality and the imposition of punishment based on risk of recidivism
may offend some judges' sense of justice. 50 6 "It is a fundamental ortho-
doxy of our criminal justice system that the punishment should fit the
crime and the individual, not the statistical history of the class of persons
to which the defendant belongs. '' 50 7 But the imposition of a particular
punishment in order to reduce the risk of future crime is nothing new in
the law: indeed, it is axiomatic to the principle of general deterrence. 50 8
If anything, it is philosophically more suspect to severely punish one of-
fender in an attempt to deter other potential criminals than it is to impose
a punishment based upon penalties that were assigned to other, like of-
fenders.509 After all, this is what common law judges do: they analogize
the facts of the instant case to the facts of controlling precedent and then
impose judgments faithful to the principle of stare decisis. 510
503. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS,
1973-1980 (1981); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979).
504. See Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994).
505. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
506. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 47.
507. Daniel S. Goodman, Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 499, 521 (1986-1987).
508. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
509. In the former case, judges employ the defendant as a scapegoat whose suffering
serves a larger social objective; in the latter case, judges use historical information to im-
pose sentences that conserve law enforcement resources, enhance the possibilities of reha-
bilitation, and maximize public safety.
510. A few scholars have written thoughtfully about a common law of sentencing. See,
e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Oppor-
tunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93 (1999); Nancy
Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523 (2006-2007).
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A third philosophical challenge to evidence-based sentencing lies in the
divergent paths mapped by forward-looking utilitarianism and backward-
looking retribution. George Bernard Shaw, cognizant of the tension be-
tween rehabilitation and retribution, articulated an acerbic syllogism:
"Now, if you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If
you are to reform him, you must improve him. And men are not im-
proved by injuries.1511 Of course, this view is not limited to playwrights;
some leading legal scholars also view risk and desert as fundamentally
immiscible principles.512 And it is easy to understand why: to the extent
that immutable characteristics are predictive of recidivism (justifying pun-
ishment on utilitarian grounds), they may imply that defendants lack
meaningful control over their criminal behavior (thereby making the im-
position of punishment problematic on retributivist grounds). The more
robust a variable is in predicting recidivism, the more meddlesome it be-
comes from a desert-based viewpoint. A characteristic that predicted re-
cidivism with perfect accuracy would force jurists and criminologists to
reassess their understandings of criminal responsibility, asking, "Is it the
defendant who recidivates or is it the characteristic?" At the bottom of
this philosophical well, of course, lies the perennial problem of free will:
If man does not have free will, why does the law insist upon punishing
him as if he does? 513 In The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Herbert
Packer provides a chillingly urbane answer, suggesting that the rationale
may be efficacy: "Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as autono-
mous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed
as if it were. '514
Evidence-based sentencing, relying upon the assumption that risk fac-
tors increase the likelihood of recidivism in a statistically predictable
fashion, suggests that choice is not absolute. For the philosophically
minded, this understanding, however, raises fundamental questions about
free will and human nature that may very well lie beyond the ability of
the sciences to answer.51 5
A fourth philosophical challenge to evidence-based sentencing relates
to an ethical dilemma: Should defense counsel embrace the use of actua-
rial sentencing, or should they reject it? Advocates who embrace evi-
511. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, 22 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD SHAW 173,
184 (1932).
512. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1438, 1441 (2001) ("Dangerousness and desert
are distinct criteria that commonly diverge .... [T]hey inevitably distribute liability and
punishment differently. To advance one, the system must sacrifice the other."); Christo-
pher Slobogin, Model Penal Code Symposium: Introduction to the Symposium on the
Model Penal Code's Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 679-80 (2009) (noting that
desert and crime control often "are at odds, not just because a dangerous person might not
be blameworthy (or vice versa), but because characteristics that appear mitigating-youth,
addiction, impaired functioning-are frequently risk factors").
513. See KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
514. PACKER, supra note 5, at 74-75.




dence-based sentencing (a means) because they like the result (an end) in
a given case, or for a given population, may not appreciate that other
populations will be penalized. For example, a defense lawyer defending a
middle-aged, middle-class, married, white woman on a first offense might
be enthusiastic about the use of evidence-based sentencing, because her
presumably-low risk score could justify a non-custodial sentence. This is
precisely the kind of zealous advocacy that characterizes excellent de-
fense work. 516 But the lawyer should understand that his next client
might be an eighteen-year-old African-American male with a lengthy
criminal history. Risk cuts both ways; it may not always be possible to
use risk when it serves the client's interests and to ignore it when it does
not.
Of course, it is possible to use evidence-based sentencing to reduce-
but not increase-penalties. This is similar to what Virginia did with its
risk assessment instrument. 517 Assuredly, the number of prison inmates
could be reduced through the use of risk instruments,518 and the net
amount of total punishment could be decreased. But the choice to make
sentencing decisions by evaluating the correlates of recidivism risk im-
plies that, at least in relative terms, there will be winners and losers. If,
for example, everyone in an office gets a raise except for you, you have
not lost money in terms of absolute value, but because everyone else now
has more buying power, you have lost money in relative terms. Similarly,
if risk profiles are used to reduce the terms of incarceration for women,
whites, the middle-aged, and the college-educated, this will not, in itself,
increase the sentences imposed upon young minority males without col-
lege degrees, but it will exacerbate the existing sentencing disparities.
This is addition through subtraction. Sentencing disparities of this kind
could precipitate legislative action similar to that which prompted pas-
sage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.519
Applying similar reasoning, Carissa Byrne Hessick notes that oppo-
nents of mass incarceration must be mindful of the policy implications
516. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Em~ics 578 (1986) (noting "the
American lawyer's professional model is that of zeal: a lawyer is expected to devote en-
ergy, intelligence, skill, and personal commitment to the single goal of furthering the cli-
ent's interests"). Of course, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct no longer call for
"zeal"-only "reasonable diligence." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
Nevertheless, zeal remains a virtue championed by many defense lawyers. See Monroe H.
Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third
Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771 (2005-2006) (arguing that
zealous representation pervades all aspects of the lawyer's work, and may require the law-
yer to violate other disciplinary rules).
517. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that low risk defendants were
assigned to non-custodial, alternative punishments).
518. This might be a sensible approach for California to adopt in response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (upholding order of
a three-judge panel for the State of California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of
design capacity, or by about 46,000 inmates).
519. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (tracing
the legislative history of SRA).
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when they use risk-based arguments to advocate for reduced penalties of
a given population. 520
If both race-effects commentators and gender-effects commentators
are looking to draw attention to the severity of modern sentencing
policy by highlighting its effects on a particular disadvantaged group,
then it is important that the arguments from each group of commen-
tators do not support more severe sentencing for another disadvan-
taged group.521
Classifications of risk create winners and losers, but they also shape our
legal conceptions in a subtle and insidious fashion. They have spawned a
"new penology" 522 that-for better or worse-is also creating a new way
of sentencing. 523 Hyatt is optimistic: "The careful use of risk assessment
is more than the future of sentencing. In a growing number of jurisdic-
tions, it has become an exciting and integral part of current sentencing
practices. '524 Harcourt is more wary:
The prediction of future dangerousness has begun to colonize our
theories of punishment.
This is remarkable because it flips on its head the traditional rela-
tionship between social science and the legal norm. The prediction
instruments were generated, created, driven by sociology and crimi-
nology. They came from the social sciences. They were exogenous
to the legal system. They had no root, nor any relation to the juris-
prudential theories of just punishment. They had no ties to our long
history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence-to centuries of debate over
the penal sanction, utilitarianism, or philosophical theories of retri-
bution. And yet they fundamentally redirected our basic notion of
how best and most fairly to administer the criminal law.525
V. CONCLUSION: HARD CHOICES ABOUT HARD TIME
Harcourt is correct in stating that risk prediction has shaped our think-
ing about punishment,52 6 yet it remains unclear whether evidence-based
sentencing is something to be feted or to be feared. Certainly, it will be
an attractive prospect for state judges forced to "sentence smarter" be-
cause of limited resources. 527 It will also be attractive to federal judges
who are frustrated by sentencing guidelines that must be calculated,528
520. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors, 14 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 127 (2010-2011).
521. Id. at 140-41.
522. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 52.
523. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
524. Hyatt, supra note 85, at 267.
525. HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 188.
526. See id.
527. See Marcus, supra note 38.




yet cannot be followed.529 It is noteworthy that organizations of jurists
and legal scholars are already legitimating the approach: evidence-based
sentencing is supported by the PEW Center on the States, 530 the National
Institute of Corrections, 531 and the National Center for State Courts,532
and it has been acknowledged by the American Law Institute. 533
Judges have good reason to adopt evidence-based sentencing. Re-
search indicates that actuarial sentencing is superior to unstructured judg-
ment,534 as is also true of decision making in other contexts. While
modern risk prediction instruments are only moderately predictive of re-
cidivism,535 they are empirically constructed and correspond to extant
criminological research such as Gendreau's meta-analysis described in
Part III.B of this Article.536 It has been suggested that not using risk
assessment instruments may constitute negligence in sentencing.5 37
Evidence-based sentencing will probably withstand constitutional chal-
lenges.538 Courts, as a general matter, are reluctant to enforce constitu-
tional rights at sentencing, 539 and the "pull of prediction" 540 will further
induce judges to uphold sentences imposed on the basis of risk. Given
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Grutter v. Bollinger,541 even sentencing
regimes that employ race as an explicit correlate of recidivism risk may
survive strict scrutiny analysis.542
Evidence-based sentencing, though, still faces a number of serious chal-
lenges. Some of these are logistical (What kind of data should judges
use? Is the available data reliable? Will actuarial sentencing reduce
crime levels, or will it increase them?), and some are philosophical (Can
risk coexist with desert? Is it justice to punish not for crime, but for the
presence of a risk factor? And does it matter if that risk factor is
ascribed?).
Risk assessment has transformed penology,543 and is transforming the
way that sentencing judges do business. Opening their eyes to the conse-
quences of risk, judges are like the character of Neo in The Matrix:544
instead of swallowing the blue pill and waking up in their beds, believing
529. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009) (holding that without further
analysis, district courts may not consider a guidelines sentence to be presumptively
reasonable).
530. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
531. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
532. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
533. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
534. See GO=rnREDSON & GOTIFREDSON, supra note 37.
535. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE 107 (2007) (reporting
AUC values between .7 and .8 for modern actuarial instruments).
536. See Gendreau et al., supra note 39.
537. See Redding, supra note 77, at 1.
538. See supra Part IV.D.
539. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 43, at 92.
540. HARCOURT, supra note 15.
541. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
542. See supra Part IV.D.
543. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 52, at 452-59.
544. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. Pictures, 1999).
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whatever they want to believe, those who have embraced a jurisprudence
based on risk have decided to swallow the red pill. 545 And, as in the film,
the reality revealed to them is harsh. Indeed, the world of risk is littered
with inequities and injustices. Why should defendants be punished more
because they were victims of child abuse? How is it possible that people
should be punished more because they were born with mental illness?
Are their underlying hardships not punishment enough? 546 Lawyers are
weaned on lofty principles like "all men are created equal, '547 but in a
world of risk and moral luck, this assertion looks like an empty platitude,
a false promise, and a lie. A golden lie, perhaps, but a lie nevertheless.
Judges, recoiling from such a bleak vision, may wish they had opted for
the blue pill.548 But there is no retreat. Harcourt writes, "What, then,
should we do? Where do we go if we forsake the actuarial? Do we re-
turn to clinical judgment? No. Clinical judgment is merely the human,
intuitive counterpart to the actuarial. It is simply the less rigorous version
of categorization and prediction-the hunch rather than the
regression. '549
Having swallowed the red pill, it becomes clear that three options are
available to judges considering evidence-based sentencing: (1) adoption
of actuarial techniques, using whatever variables are most predictive, re-
gardless of what they are; (2) adoption of actuarial techniques, eliminat-
ing from the model any variables that are objectionable on legal or
philosophical grounds; or (3) rejection of actuarial techniques.
The first option is to embrace evidence-based sentencing and to use
whatever predictive measures that science and the law will allow. Suspect
variables (e.g., race, gender, age, marital status, education level, and
class) can be employed in sentencing decisions, perhaps to make out deci-
sions to determine length of sentence,550 and perhaps to impose condi-
tions of confinement or supervision.5 51
545. See generally TAKING THE RED PILL: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN The
Matrix 14 (Glenn Yeffeth ed., 2003) (equating the ingestion of the red pill with the freeing
of the mind).
546. See, e.g., ANTHONY CLARE, PSYCHIATRY IN DISSENT 354 (2d ed. 1980) (quoting
the maxim furiosus satis ipso furore punitur [the mad man is sufficiently punished by his
madness]).
547. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
548. See B. F. SKINNER, WALDEN Two 240 (2005) (describing a conversation between
Frazier, who asks "What would you do if you found yourself in possession of an effective
science of behavior?" and Castle, who answers, "I think I would dump your science of
behavior in the ocean." When Frazier asks if he would "deny men all the help [he] could
otherwise give them," Castle says that by dumping the knowledge in the ocean, he would
give them their freedom. Frazier warns that in so doing he would only hand control over to
others).
549. HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 237-38.
550. See, e.g., GREENWOOD, supra note 97 (describing principle of selective
incapacitation).
551. See Slobogin, supra note 502, at 302 (suggesting that in some jurisdictions "retribu-
tive considerations might be considered relevant only in setting the outer limit of the sen-
tence, with its precise length in a given case dependent upon an evaluation of
dangerousness and rehabilitative potential").
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Of course, providing judges with a sentencing information system that
identifies optimal punishments for matched cases in a straightforward
manner creates the possibility that judges will simply run the numbers
and impose the penalty identified by the software.552 After all, even
though sentencing judges were critical of mandatory federal guidelines, 553
they adhered to them,554 and continue to do so post-Booker.5 55 Even if
judges do look beyond the statistics and beyond the four comers of the
law,5 56 risk predictions are likely to frame the judge's thinking and to
influence the sentence that is eventually imposed.557 On the other hand,
a judges' blind adherence to a reliable sentencing information system
might not be entirely bad: studies indicate that we may be better served
by an algorithm than by even expert judgment.5 58
The second option is to employ evidence-based sentencing, but to ex-
clude variables that are legally impermissible or that offend our sense of
justice. While even the explicit use of race might survive strict scrutiny
analysis, 559 courts may choose to omit race from their models of recidi-
vism. 560 But as variables are omitted from mathematical models, the pre-
dictive value of those models is degraded. 561 And what variables are
unobjectionable and should be retained? If even something as quotidian
as criminal history, a staple in traditional sentencing,562 can operate as a
proxy for race,563 what variables are free from suspicion? Gender? Age?
Family background? As each variable is discarded as antithetical to
American legal values,564 the predictive value of the model dwindles until
552. Judges may be unlikely to look beneath the interface of the sentencing information
system and challenge the underlying statistical basis. See Redding, supra note 77, at 16
n.79 ("Judges and lawyers typically have little or no training in science, and few understand
basic statistical concepts.").
553. See JOHNSON & GILBERT, supra note 33, at 3 (1997) ("The general pattern of judge
responses suggests that, while most are willing to work within a guidelines system in some
form, they strongly prefer a system in which judges are accorded more discretion .... ");
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 66, at A-i, 1 (reporting that approximately 40% of
surveyed judges believed the guidelines had a high degree of general effectiveness).
554. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF United States v.
Booker on Federal Sentencing vi-vii (2006) (noting that pre-Booker sentences conformed
with sentencing guidelines in more than 90% of cases). In United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment and remedied the violation by rendering them advisory. Booker, 543
U.S. at 220.
555. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 554, at vi (noting a post-Booker con-
formity rate of 85.9%).
556. This is relatively infrequent. See J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the
Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 29 CARDOzo L. REV. 669, 684 (noting "existing prece-
dents often directly preclude judges from imposing a sentence that is moral and just").
557. See Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring
Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1548 (2001).
558. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
559. See supra Part IV.D.
560. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 98, at 27-28 (noting that race was omitted from
Virginia's prediction instrument).
561. See Petersilia & Turner, supra note 42, at 173.
562. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
563. See Harcourt, supra note 214.
564. See Goodman, supra note 507.
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we are left with something no more robust than the best guess of a
judge.565
The third option is to reject the actuarial approach.5 66 Just as there is
something seductive about the promise of risk prediction, there is some-
thing alluring about rejecting the role of the computer in any endeavor
that is as fraught with meaning as criminal sentencing:
We forget that the computer is just a tool. It is supposed to help-
not substitute for thought. It is completely indifferent to compas-
sion. It has no moral sense. It has no sense of fairness. It can add up
figures, but can't evaluate the assumptions for which the figures
stand. Its judgment is no judgment at all. There is no algorithm for
human judgment. 567
But if we do not discriminate between offenders using risk (the regres-
sion line), and do not discriminate using clinical judgment (the hunch),
then we do not discriminate. In this case, we treat all offenders alike,
even though there may be meaningful differences between them.568 We
may then over-sentence, allowing prisoners to languish needlessly in pris-
ons, at great taxpayer expense, doing serious damage to individuals, fami-
lies, and communities. 569 Alternatively, we may under-sentence, allowing
truly dangerous offenders back into the community to commit new
crimes and create new victims. 570 The American Law Institute has de-
scribed this conundrum:
In short, we can avoid the unneeded incarceration of those incor-
rectly identified as dangerous offenders (whom we cannot separate
in advance from the truly dangerous) only by accepting the cost of
serious victimizations of innocent parties (whom we cannot identify
in advance). There is no wholly acceptable alternative in either di-
rection-indeed, both options approach the intolerable. The proper
allocation of risk, as between convicted offenders and potential
crime victims, is a policy question as difficult as any faced by criminal
law in a civilized society.571
Without question, evidence-based sentencing raises excruciatingly diffi-
cult questions. But these are questions that must be answered. "Jurispru-
dential considerations in premising legal decisions on these specific risk
565. See supra note 549 and accompanying text.
566. This is Harcourt's suggestion. Specifically, he advocates randomization instead of
discrimination by risk. See generally HARCOURT, supra note 15.
567. Bruce S. Jenkins, U.S. Senior District Judge, District of Utah, The Federal Court
System: For Thinking Press 1, for Compassion Press 2, for Judgment Press 3, Address to
the Federal Bar Association Seminar (Oct. 12, 2001), in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
(2002), at 198.
568. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833, 870 (1992).
569. See Oleson, supra note 15, at 759-60 (summarizing the undesirable effects of mass
incarceration).
570. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 37 (2d ed. 1995) ("To
deter an offender from repeating his actions, a penalty should be severe enough to out-
weigh in his mind the benefits of the crime.").
571. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. e (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2008).
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factors can no longer be avoided .... ,,572 Evaluations of risk are ever
more ubiquitous in our "risk society."'573 Judges and jurists must deter-
mine whether and how to incorporate these conceptions into modem sen-
tencing practice.
572. Monahan, supra note 49, at 434-35.
573. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SocIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter
trans., 1992).
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VI. APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES ASSESSED BY
RISK INSTRUMENTS
Assessment Number of
Instrument Variables Variables Measured
Burgess (1928) 22 Nature of offense
Number of associates in committing offense for which convicted
Nationality of the inmate's father
Parental status, including broken homes
Marital status of the inmate
Type of criminal, as first offender, occasional offender, habitual
offender, professional criminal
Social type as ne'er-do-well, gangster, hobo
Country from which committed
Size of community
Type of neighborhood
Resident or transient in community when arrested
Statement of trial judge and prosecuting attorney with reference to
recommendation for or against leniency
Whether or not commitment was upon acceptance of lesser plea
Nature and length of sentence imposed
Months of sentence actually served before parole
Previous criminal record of the prisoner
Previous work record
Punishment record in the institution
Age at the time of parole
Mental age according to psychiatric examination
Personality type according to psychiatric examination
Psychiatric prognosis
Glueck & Glueck 7 Industrial habits
(1930) Seriousness and frequency of prereformatory crime
Arrests for crimes preceding
Penal experience preceding
Economic responsibility preceding
Mental abnormality on entrance
Frequency of offenses in the reformatory












Salient Factor 9 Prior convictions
Score (1974) Prior incarcerations






Living arrangements on release
Greenwood (1982) 7 Prior conviction for the same charge
Incarceration for more than 50% of the previous 2 years
Conviction before the age of 16
Having served time in a juvenile facility
Drug use during the previous 2 years
Drug use as a juvenile




Instrument Variables Variables Measured










VRAG 12 Lived with both biological parents to age 16
Elementary School Maladjustment
History of alcohol problems
Marital status
Criminal history score for nonviolent offenses




Meets DSM criteria for any personality disorder
LCSC 14 Failed to provide support for at least 1 biological child
Terminated formal education prior to graduating from high school
Duration of longest job ever held
Number of times terminated from a job for irresponsibility or quit
with no apparent reason
History of drug or alcohol abuse
Marital background
Physical appearance (tattoos)
Nature of offense (intrusive v. nonintrusive)
History of prior arrests for intrusive behavior
Use of weapon or threatened use of weapon during offense
Physical abuse of significant others
Number of prior arrests
Age at time of first arrest
History of being a behavior/management problem at school






Age at first adult conviction
Previous convictions for assault
Marital status
Interval at risk since last offense
Number of dependants
Current total aggregate sentence
Previous convictions for sex offenses
Previous convictions for break and enter
Employment status
















2011] Risk in Sentencing
Assessment Number of
Instrument Variables Variables Measured
RPI 8 Age
Number of prior arrests
Weapon use during offense
Employment status
History of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse
Absconding from previous supervision
College degree
Living with spouse and/or children
PCL-R 20 Glib and superficial charm




Lack of remorse or guilt
Shallow affect (superficial emotional responsiveness)





Lack of realistic long-term goals
Impulsivity
Irresponsibility
Failure to accept responsibility for own actions
Many short-term marital relationships
Juvenile delinquency
Revocation of conditional release
Criminal versatility










CPI 18 Dominance (Do)











Achievement via Conformance (Ac)







Convictions for index non-sexual violence
Convictions for non-sexual violence
Prior sex offenses
Number of prior sentencing dates
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Assessment Number of
Instrument Variables Variables Measured
Virginia Criminal 11 Gender
Sentencing Age
Commission Risk Marital status
Instrument Employment status
Whether the offender acted alone when committing the crime
Additional offenses at conviction
Arrest or confinement within the past 12 months
Prior criminal record
Prior drug felony convictions
Adult incarceration
Juvenile incarceration
Missouri Sentencing 11 Prior unrelated findings of guilt misdemeanor/jail sentences of 30+
Advisory days
Commission Risk Prior unrelated felony findings of guilt
Assessment Scale Prior prison incarcerations
Five years without a finding of guilt or incarceration
Revocations of probation or parole
Recidivist related present offense
Age
Prior escape









26 Age at time of current sentence
Gender
Prior juvenile felony convictions
Prior juvenile non-sex violent felony convictions for: homicide,
robbery, kidnapping, assault, extortion, unlawful imprisonment,
custodial interference, domestic violence, or weapon
Prior juvenile felony sex convictions
Prior commitments to a juvenile institution
Total number of commitments to the Department of Corrections
Number of adult felony sentences: murder/manslaughter
Number of adult felony sentences: sex offense
Number of adult felony sentences: violent property conviction for a
felony robbery/kidnapping/extortion /unlawful imprisonment/
custodial/interference offense/harassment/burglary 1/arson 1
Number of adult felony sentences: assault offense-not domestic
violence related
Number of adult felony sentences: domestic violence assault or
violation of a domestic violence related protection order,
restraining order, or no-contact order/harassment/malicious mischief
Number of adult felony sentences: weapon offense
Number of adult felony sentences: property offense
Number of adult felony sentences: drug offense
Number of adult felony sentences: escape
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: assault offense-not
domestic violence related
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: domestic violence assault
or violation of a domestic violence related protection order,
restraining order, or no-contact order
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: sex offense
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: other domestic violence:
any non-violent misdemeanor convictions such as trespass, property
destruction, malicious mischief, theft, etc., that are connected to
domestic violence
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: weapon offense
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: property offense
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: drug offense
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: escapes
Number of adult misdemeanor sentences: alcohol offense
Total sentence/supervision violations
1402
Comments
0 LAS. 1
